Le mardi 03 septembre 2013 à 15:37 -0400, Jay Greguske a écrit : > On 09/03/2013 01:54 PM, Daniel J Walsh wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hash: SHA1 > > > > On 09/03/2013 12:29 PM, Michael scherer wrote: > >> On Tue, Sep 03, 2013 at 09:48:52AM -0600, Kevin Fenzi wrote: > >>> On Tue, 03 Sep 2013 10:10:32 -0400 Jay Greguske <jgregusk@xxxxxxxxxx> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> If we had SELinux policy enabled on the builders and used MLS on the > >>>> chroots that would mitigate chroot-to-chroot attacks. I'm not sure if > >>>> policy could prevent a chroot'ed process from getting access to the > >>>> builder's certificate. If it could, I think getting SELinux working on > >>>> the builders would be an easier path than re-writing koji to use VMs. > >>>> > >>>> Maybe someone with more expertise could comment on the latter issue. > >>> > >>> In the past we had selinux disabled on the builders, as mock didn't > >>> handle selinux very well at all and there were issues. (even in > >>> permissive mode). > >>> > >>> With this switch to Fedora 19 for builders, we also enabled selinux in > >>> permissive mode to gather information on any outstanding issues/avcs. > >>> > >>> Ideally I would like to get them all to enforcing and make sure we lock > >>> down the builds as much as we are able from the vm. > >> > >> the main issue is that mock should do the transition to a different domain > >> once it run anything in chroot. I do have a patch but I was not able to > >> make a policy for the transition ( or my patch is buggy ) and I didn't look > >> at it since a few weeks. I can send it if someone want to take a look. > >> > > Yes The builders should run each mock with a unique MCS Label and then lock > > them down with SELinux. I would be willing to help with this. > > > > This would be the easiest solution to the problem of separating out the chroots. > > > > Are you confident we can protect the host itself from attacks from a > mock chroot? That's what Openshift Online use, and according to Dan, it resisted so far, and not because no one tried. You have to balance the density/efficiency/overhead vs the protection. Something like cubes running in a VM over a VM from a different technology would be more secure than a regular shared ssh server, but there is a price :) -- Michael Scherer -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct