On Mon, Aug 26, 2013 at 11:07:29AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > On 08/24/2013 11:38 AM, Reindl Harald wrote: > >https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=319901 > > > >looks like Redhat based systems are the only remaining > >which does not support EECDHE which is a shame these > >days in context of PRISM and more and more Ciphers > >are going to be unuseable (BEAST/CRIME weakness) > > Current Fedora supports perfect forward secrecy just fine. Just fine -- assuming one ignores the 4-5x performance penalty of DH (vs. non-PFS/ECDHE), and also ignore IE and Safari as clients ? > It's just that web server operators routinely refuse to offer it. The perf penalty of DH-RSA seems a bit high, and web server operators are likely fighting anything that is likely to introduce latency.. > (The situation is different with mail servers.) Operational benefits > look rather marginal to me. It may discourage interested parties > from requesting server private keys, but even that isn't assured. > It does not help against server operators which provide third > parties with cleartext copies of transmissions, obviously. It helps against broad prism-style interception of all traffic, with the intention of decrypting at some later point. -jf -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
