On Mon, 10.06.13 16:01, Simo Sorce (simo@xxxxxxxxxx) wrote: > On Sun, 2013-06-09 at 17:17 +0200, Lennart Poettering wrote: > > On Fri, 07.06.13 22:33, Richard W.M. Jones (rjones@xxxxxxxxxx) wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Jun 07, 2013 at 06:55:46PM +0200, Lennart Poettering wrote: > > > > User "simo" creates /dev/shm/1000/ even though 1000 is the UID of user > > > > "lennart". Lennart can never start PA again, ever. And can't do anything > > > > about it, because "simo" is in control, and /dev/shm is sticky. > > > > > > For /run we create /run/user/<uid> in pam_systemd (I think?). > > > Can we do the same for /dev/shm/<uid>? > > > > There's no benefit in doing that. > > > > /run/user is not world-writable. Hence creating this dir at login time > > is totally safe, since only trusted code can create dirs in there. This > > is different for /dev/shm which is world-writable, and where creating > > dirs at login doesn't solve anything, because any unprivileged user > > could easily create dirs for all users and then make it impossible to > > log in for them. > > All this makes me wonder, why are you using /dev/shm at all if it is so > bad ? There are many other ways to do IPC, so what's keeping you > on /dev/shm ? XDG_RUNTIME_DIR is newer than PA. And POSIX shared memory (i.e. /dev/shm/) s still the best option if you actually want a shared namespace for the segments... Lennart -- Lennart Poettering - Red Hat, Inc. -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
