Re: Mozilla plugins packaging [Re: SELinuxDenyPtrace: Write, compile, run, but don't debug applications?]

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On 04/09/2012 02:06 PM, Jan Kratochvil wrote:
Wouldn't it be better to package Mozilla plugins in Fedora so that they are
trusted?  And then disable Firefox plugins downloads the same way as there is
Firefox updater disabled (--disable-updater) as it would conflict/duplicate
the rpm packaging of Firefox anyway.

(I have here some undebugged packaging of mozilla-remember-passwords so that
I already tried to participate.)

Is not upstream, Mozilla in this case, Gnome for shell extensions, Google for Androids apps. etc responsible for conducting security auditing on extensions/addons they host/provide upstream?

And another thing why do we want to package something that works out of the box for the end user like Mozilla and Gnome shell extensions/addons do as opposed to just simply direct users upstream which they would have go anyway for anything we might not ship?

JBG
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