Matthew Garrett <mjg59 <at> srcf.ucam.org> writes: > ... > http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Features/Trusted_Boot is a proposed > feature for F16. > ... Hi, there will be some posts on Fedora users and testers lists, so please take a look. http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/users/2011-June/400539.html http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/test/2011-June/100976.html In the meantime, I got access to this mailing list, so all is well :-) I have done some inventory on this topic, and have some questions. The Intel Trusted Platform consists of two components: - Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip A hardware component, consisting of cryptographic processor and secure memory. - Trusted Boot A software component, open-source and partially close-source (?) components, in Fedora packages. # yum install tboot Installing: tboot i686 20110429-1.fc15 fedora 355 k Installing for dependencies: trousers i686 0.3.6-1.fc15 fedora 279 k Trusted Boot is a mechanism by which a pre-kernel/VMM module (that uses Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT)) performs a measured (pre-identified) and verified launch of an OS kernel/VMM. First, the obvious questions. Why do you need Trusted Boot mechanism to ensure that identified and origin- verified Linux kernel is booted ? Why signing a kernel (a la GPG) is not good enough to verify its origin at boot time ? Now, regarding the Trusted Boot solution. The obvious question: why does an open-source distro like Fedora (but also Red Hat) want to philosophically accept and technically support this solution ? Will the TPM allow a third party remote access to the machine ? Will the TPM be BIOS-configurable (enable/disable) by the user (hardware owner) ? If so, how will that impact the kernel selection in boot process (tboot enable/disable) ? How is that tboot blob module secured from tampering ? By the virtue of beeing associated with the "root of trust" ? If the Launch Control Policy can be created and modified by the user, then what prevents an attacker from impersonating the usersysadmin, modifying the policy, and causing a denial-of-boot or unintended-boot attack ? There is more that this project implements (root of trust, etc). Ref: tcsd(8) Can that "root of trust" be compromised by TSS applications or any other means (e.g. through tools provided by this project) ? ... Ref: tcsd(8) DEVICE DRIVERS tcsd is compatible with the IBM Research TPM device driver available from http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa and the TPM device driver available from http://sf.net/projects/tmpdd Are these drivers open-source ? Is TPM device driver open-source ? JB -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
