On 11/11/2010 07:55 PM, Roman Rakus wrote: > On 11/08/2010 03:12 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: > >> Here is the attack: Your system is running with nice secure encrypted >> drives, no console access (or a locked screen on a laptop). The >> attacker inserts a bootable USB key and hits the power switch. System >> reboots into the USB key, it retrieves the cryptographic keys for >> reading your disk from memory, then copies whatever information it >> likes. >> > Only if the laptop is configured to boot from the USB. But I know, > everything here is theoretical. > > RR > Yes, it's theoretical; I only wanted to know if there is a protection of any kind already implemented. I did a test and if i use an electric screwdriver I can get access to the laptop memory in eight seconds. The next step would be a freezer spray, -50C and less, removing of DIMMs from the laptop and reading them. I don't know how you, but when I am about to leave my workplace, I click on the button "Shut Down" and bye, bye, my computer, walking out of the room. Vaclav M. -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
