Adam Williamson pÃÅe v Po 01. 11. 2010 v 10:55 -0700: > On Mon, 2010-11-01 at 18:51 +0100, Miloslav TrmaÄ wrote: > > > Sorry, but characterizing it as a 'known problem' is misleading. It's > > > easy to forecast failure, and you'll likely always be correct in *some* > > > cases if you forecast enough failures. Only if you precisely forecast > > > only the failures that actually happen, and do not forecast any failures > > > that don't happen, can your forecast be considered truly reliable. > > > The accuracy of prediction, and especially accuracy of the timing, is > > not at all relevant. In fact, it is _preciselly_ the unknown nature of > > risks that requires thinking about them in advance. > > Which rather contradicts your description of it as a 'known problem', > yes? No; the existence of the problem was known, only the timing and precise extent was not. > If you want to continue with the analogy, what you seem to be saying is > that we should never have implemented the policy in the first place, That is one option; another would be adding a "I'm the maintainer and I really mean it" checkbox for security updates (with FESCo/Fedora QA/somebody else reviewing the cases retrospectively, if they feel like it); yeat another is not enforcing the policy on security updates at all, as I seem to remember was proposed (or even implemented?) at one time. Mirek -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
