For Postgresql there is a minor security issue. The start scripts do "su - postgres" to launch the daemon, this is to run the ~/.bash_profile file to get settings for the database. The problem with this is that such scripts are writable by the postgres user and thus the postgres user can cause their own program to run which can stuff key-presses into the input buffer of the controlling terminal, this controlling terminal is in many instances (*) the terminal of an administrative shell, and commands such as "chmod 666 /etc/shadow" could be executed. To solve this I have written a program named init_su to provide the necessary functionality from su(1) without the terminal issue. init_su closes all file handles other than 1 and 2 (stdout and stderr). File handles 1 and 2 are fstat()'d, if they are regular files or pipes then they are left open (no attack is possible through a file or pipe), otherwise they are closed and /dev/null is opened instead. /dev/null is opened for file handle 0 regardless of what it might have pointed to previously. Then setsid() is called to create a new session for the process (make it a group leader), this invalidates /dev/tty. Then the uid is changed and the daemon is started. I have attached the source code to init_su, please check it out and tell me what you think. Also this solves a minor problem with the SE Linux patched su and sudo not doing quite what we want for daemon startup. (*) On system boot and shutdown there is no problem. It's when the administrator uses /etc/init.d/postgresql to start or stop the database that there is potential for attack. -- http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page
#include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <pwd.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <syslog.h> void usage(const char * const msg) { if(msg) fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s\n\n", msg); fprintf(stderr, "Usage: init_su [-l] user -c command\n"); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int i, fd; int login = 0; char *command = NULL, *user = NULL, *shell = NULL, *nu_argv[4]; struct passwd *pw; int int_c = 0; while(int_c != -1) { int_c = getopt(argc, argv, "-lc:s:"); switch(int_c) { case 1: if(!strcmp(optarg, "-")) { login = 1; } else { user = optarg; } break; case 'l': login = 1; break; case 's': shell = optarg; break; case 'c': command = optarg; break; } } if(!user || !command) usage(NULL); pw = getpwnam(user); if(!pw) usage("User unknown."); if(setregid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid)) usage("Can't setgid(), are you root?"); if(setreuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid)) usage("Can't setuid(), are you root?"); if(!shell) shell = pw->pw_shell; if(login) { nu_argv[0] = strrchr(shell, '/'); if(!nu_argv[0]) usage("Bad shell."); nu_argv[0] = strdup(nu_argv[0]); nu_argv[0][0] = '-'; } else nu_argv[0] = shell; nu_argv[1] = "-c"; nu_argv[2] = command; nu_argv[3] = NULL; close(0); for(i = 3; i < 1024; i++) close(i); openlog("initrc_su", LOG_CONS | LOG_NOWAIT, LOG_DAEMON); fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR); if(fd == -1) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't open /dev/null when trying to execute program %s", command); return 1; } for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) { struct stat sbuf; if(i != fd && (fstat(i, &sbuf) == -1 || (!S_ISREG(sbuf.st_mode) && !S_ISFIFO(sbuf.st_mode)) )) { close(i); if(dup2(fd, i) != i) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't dup2() when trying to execute program %s", command); return 1; } } } if(fd >= 3) close(fd); setsid(); /* it's OK if this fails as we get the right result anyway */ execv(shell, nu_argv); syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't exec program %s", command); return 1; }