On Thu, Jul 09, 2009 at 05:07:05PM +0200, yersinia wrote: > But something one have to pay a security prize on not disabling it : it > render impossible to have a > centralizzated security integrity management (e.g. rfc.sf.net for example) > or one have to skip from check the prelink binary. Very bad i think. That's what prelink -y is for, it verifies the binary would prelink from unprelinked state to bitwise same file and gives you the bits before prelinking, which you can use for verification. rpm -V uses this, why can't other security integrity apps do the same? Jakub -- fedora-devel-list mailing list fedora-devel-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-devel-list
