On Mon, 2004-07-05 at 21:54, W. Michael Petullo wrote: > >> I am working on implementing encrypted root filesystem support to > >> mkinitrd. See > >> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=124789 for more > >> information and an patch. > > > I looked at the patch any I see the problem that you need to call > > mkinitrd with certain arguments in order for this to work. This > > should just kind of determine the parameters (i.e. read them from a > > config file written while creating the encrypted root device) used on > > the current root fs and apply them automatically so that calls to > > mkinitrd from e.g. the kernel pkgs' %post scripts work. > > Okay, that's a great point. Where should the configuration file be? / > etc/sysconfig/rootfs would get my vote. ACK as far as I'm concerned. > If my system password is not unknown to others then my encryption > password is probably no good either. I think root has to be trusted in > most cases. I would be interested to hear any arguments that "only > mount[ing] the encrypted, potentially sensitive stuff when you need it" > would be more secure than unmounting encrypted volumes a login time > (assuming a strong system authentication token). If I have a different password, there is no representation of it on disk (like crypt() or MD5 hashes of a login password). There's a reason my PGP pass phrase is different from my login password as well ;-). If one is compromised, the other isn't. Nils -- Nils Philippsen / Red Hat / nphilipp@xxxxxxxxxx "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." -- B. Franklin, 1759 PGP fingerprint: C4A8 9474 5C4C ADE3 2B8F 656D 47D8 9B65 6951 3011
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