On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 11:02 AM, Andrey Pronin <apronin@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > If the updated ecryptfs header data is not written to disk before > the lower file is truncated, a crash may leave the filesystem > in the state when the lower file truncation is journaled, while > the changes to the ecryptfs header are lost (if the underlying > filesystem is ext4 in data=ordered mode, for example). As a result, > upon remounting and repairing the file may have a pre-truncation > length and garbage data after the post-truncation end. > > To reproduce, make a snapshot of the underlying ext4 filesystem > mounted with data=ordered while asynchronously truncating to zero a > group of files in ecryptfs mounted on top. Mount ecryptfs for the > snapshot and check the contents of the group of files that was > being truncated. The following script reproduces it in almost 100% > of runs: > > cd /tmp > mkdir -p ./loop > dd if=/dev/zero of=./file.img bs=1M count=10 > PW=secret > > LOOPDEV=`losetup --find --show ./file.img` > mkfs -t ext4 $LOOPDEV > mount -t ext4 -o rw,nodev,relatime,seclabel,commit=600,data=ordered\ > $LOOPDEV ./loop > mkdir -p ./loop/vault ./loop/mount > mount -t ecryptfs -o rw,relatime,seclabel,ecryptfs_cipher=aes,\ > ecryptfs_key_bytes=16,ecryptfs_unlink_sigs,ecryptfs_passthrough=no,\ > ecryptfs_enable_filename_crypto=no,passphrase_passwd="$PW",no_sig_cache\ > ./loop/vault ./loop/mount > for i in `seq 1 100`; do echo $i > ./loop/mount/test.$i; done > sync > for i in `seq 100 -1 1`; do truncate -s 0 ./loop/mount/test.$i; done & > sleep 0.1; sync; cp ./file.img ./file.snap; sleep 1 > umount ./loop/mount > umount ./loop > losetup -d $LOOPDEV > > LOOPDEV=`losetup --find --show ./file.snap` > mount -t ext4 -o rw,nodev,relatime,seclabel,commit=600,data=ordered\ > $LOOPDEV ./loop > mount -t ecryptfs -o rw,relatime,seclabel,ecryptfs_cipher=aes,\ > ecryptfs_key_bytes=16,ecryptfs_unlink_sigs,ecryptfs_passthrough=no,\ > ecryptfs_enable_filename_crypto=no,passphrase_passwd="$PW",no_sig_cache\ > ./loop/vault ./loop/mount > for i in `seq 1 100`; do > if [ `stat -c %s ./loop/mount/test.$i` != 0 ] && > [ `cat ./loop/mount/test.$i` != $i ]; then > echo -n "!!! garbage at $i: "; cat ./loop/mount/test.$i; echo > fi > done > umount ./loop/mount > umount ./loop > losetup -d $LOOPDEV > > Signed-off-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > > Changes since v1: > - Switched to datasync=1 for ecryptfs_fsync_lower() in truncate_upper()\ It looks like this patch got lost... Can we get it in? Thanks! > > fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 1 + > fs/ecryptfs/inode.c | 6 ++++++ > fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ > 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h > index f622a733f7ad..567698421270 100644 > --- a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h > +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h > @@ -689,6 +689,7 @@ int ecryptfs_read_lower_page_segment(struct page *page_for_ecryptfs, > pgoff_t page_index, > size_t offset_in_page, size_t size, > struct inode *ecryptfs_inode); > +int ecryptfs_fsync_lower(struct inode *ecryptfs_inode, int datasync); > struct page *ecryptfs_get_locked_page(struct inode *inode, loff_t index); > int ecryptfs_parse_packet_length(unsigned char *data, size_t *size, > size_t *length_size); > diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c b/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c > index 5eab400e2590..a96988ba6928 100644 > --- a/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c > +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c > @@ -827,6 +827,12 @@ static int truncate_upper(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia, > "rc = [%d]\n", rc); > goto out; > } > + rc = ecryptfs_fsync_lower(inode, 1); > + if (rc) { > + printk(KERN_WARNING "Problem with ecryptfs_fsync_lower," > + "continue without syncing; " > + "rc = [%d]\n", rc); > + } > /* We are reducing the size of the ecryptfs file, and need to > * know if we need to reduce the size of the lower file. */ > lower_size_before_truncate = > diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c b/fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c > index 09fe622274e4..ba2dd6263875 100644 > --- a/fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c > +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c > @@ -271,3 +271,25 @@ int ecryptfs_read_lower_page_segment(struct page *page_for_ecryptfs, > flush_dcache_page(page_for_ecryptfs); > return rc; > } > + > +/** > + * ecryptfs_fsync_lower > + * @ecryptfs_inode: The eCryptfs inode > + * @datasync: Only perform a fdatasync operation > + * > + * Write back data and metadata for the lower file to disk. If @datasync is > + * set only metadata needed to access modified file data is written. > + * > + * Returns 0 on success; less than zero on error > + */ > +int ecryptfs_fsync_lower(struct inode *ecryptfs_inode, int datasync) > +{ > + struct file *lower_file; > + > + lower_file = ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_inode)->lower_file; > + if (!lower_file) > + return -EIO; > + if (!lower_file->f_op->fsync) > + return 0; > + return vfs_fsync(lower_file, datasync); > +} > -- > 2.13.0.rc0.306.g87b477812d-goog > -- Dmitry -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe ecryptfs" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html