Hi On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > as was discussed a while ago, there are some serious security flaws with > the current drm master model, that allows a > user that had previous access or current access to an X server terminal > to access the GPU memory of the active X server, without being > authenticated to the X server and thereby also access other user's > secret information 1a) and 1b) are moot if you disallow primary-node access but require clients to use render-nodes with dma-buf. There're no gem-names on render-nodes so no way to access other buffers (assuming the GPU does command-stream checking and/or VM). 2) There is no DRM-generic data other than buffers that is global. So imho this is a driver-specific issue. So I cannot see why this is a DRM issue. The only leaks I see are legacy interfaces and driver-specific interfaces. The first can be disabled via chmod() for clients, and the second is something driver authors should fix. Thanks David _______________________________________________ dri-devel mailing list dri-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel