Re: [PATCH 08/16] drm/vmwgfx: implement mmap access managament

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 08/16/2013 03:19 PM, David Herrmann wrote:
Hi

On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:35 PM, Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
(CC'ing the proper people since I'm still on parental leave).

On 08/13/2013 11:44 PM, David Herrmann wrote:

Please see inline comments.


Hi

On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 9:38 PM, David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Correctly allow and revoke buffer access on each open/close via the new
VMA offset manager.

I haven't yet had time to check the access policies of the new VMA offset
manager, but anything that is identical or stricter than the current vmwgfx
verify_access() would be fine. If it's stricter however, we need to
double-check backwards user-space compatibility.
My patches make vmw_dmabuf_alloc_ioctl() add the caller's open-file
(file*) to the list of allowed users of the new bo.
vmw_dmabuf_unref_ioctl() removes it again. I haven't seen any way to
pass a user-dmabuf to another user so there is currently at most one
user for a vmw_dmabuf. vmw_user_dmabuf_reference() looks like it is
intended exactly for this case so it would have to add the file* of
the caller to the list of allowed users. I will change that in v2.
This means every user who gets a handle for the buffer (like gem_open)
will be added to the allowed users. For TTM-object currently only a
single user is allowed.

So I replace vmw_user_bo->base.tfile with a list (actually rbtree) of
allowed files. So more than one user can have access. This, however,
breaks the "shareable" attribute which I wasn't aware of. As far as I
can see, "shareable" is only used by vmwgfx_surface.c and can be set
by userspace to allow arbitrary processes to map this buffer (sounds
like a security issue similar to gem flink).
I actually think we can replace the "shareable" attribute with proper
access-management in the vma-manager. But first I'd need to know
whether "shareable = true" is actually used by vmwgfx user-space and
how buffers are shared? Do you simply pass the mmap offset between
processes? Or do you pass some handle?

Buffer- and surface sharing is done by passing an opaque (not mmap) handle.
A process intending to map the shared buffer must obtain the map offset through a vmw_user_dmabuf_reference() call, and that only works if the buffer is "shareable". mmap offsets are never passed between processes, but valid only if obtained directly
from the kernel driver.

This means that currently buffer mapping should have the same access restriction as the X server imposes on DRI clients; If a process is allowed to open the drm device, it also has map access to all "shareable" objects, which is a security hole in the sense that verify_access() should really check that the caller, if not the buffer owner, is also authenticated.

The reason verify_access() is there is to make the TTM buffer object transparent to how it is exported to user space (GEM or TTM objects). Apparently the GEM TTM drivers have ignored this hook for some unknown
reason.

Some ideas:
1) Rather than having a list of allowable files on each buffer object, perhaps we should have a user and a group and a set of permissions (for user, group and system) more like how files are handled?

2) Rather than imposing a security policy in the vma manager, could we perhaps have a set a utility functions that are called through verify_access(). Each driver could then have a wrapper to gather the needed information and
hand it over to the VMA manager?


If you really pass mmap offsets in user-space and rely on this, I
guess there is no way I can make vmwgfx use the vma-manager access
management. I will have to find a way to work around it or move the
"shareable" flag to ttm_bo.

   We also need to make vmw_user_dmabuf_reference()
correctly increase the vma-allow counter, but it is unused so remove it
instead.
IIRC this function or a derivative thereof is used heavily in an upcoming
version driver, so if possible, please add a corrected version rather than
remove the (currently) unused code. This will trigger a merge error and the
upcoming code can be more easily corrected.
I will do so.

Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@xxxxxxxxx>
Just as a hint, this patch would allow to remove the
"->access_verify()" callback in vmwgfx. No other driver uses it,
afaik. I will try to add this in v2.

Regards
David

---
   drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c | 29
+++++++++++++++++------------
   1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c
b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c
index 0e67cf4..4d3f0ae 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_resource.c
@@ -499,6 +499,12 @@ int vmw_dmabuf_alloc_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev,
void *data,
          if (unlikely(ret != 0))
                  goto out_no_dmabuf;

+       ret = drm_vma_node_allow(&dma_buf->base.vma_node,
file_priv->filp);
+       if (ret) {
+               vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&dma_buf);
+               goto out_no_dmabuf;
+       }
+
          rep->handle = handle;
          rep->map_handle =
drm_vma_node_offset_addr(&dma_buf->base.vma_node);
          rep->cur_gmr_id = handle;
@@ -517,7 +523,18 @@ int vmw_dmabuf_unref_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev,
void *data,
   {
          struct drm_vmw_unref_dmabuf_arg *arg =
              (struct drm_vmw_unref_dmabuf_arg *)data;
+       struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
+       struct vmw_dma_buffer *dma_buf;
+       int ret;
+
+       ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(tfile, arg->handle, &dma_buf);
+       if (ret)
+               return -EINVAL;

+       drm_vma_node_revoke(&dma_buf->base.vma_node, file_priv->filp);
+       vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&dma_buf);
+
+       /* FIXME: is this equivalent to vmw_dmabuf_unreference(dma_buf)?
*/

No. A ttm ref object is rather similar to a generic GEM object, only that
it's generic in the sense that it is not restricted to buffers, and can make
any desired object visible to user-space. So translated the below code
removes a reference that the arg->handle holds on the "gem" object,
potentially destroying the whole object in which the "gem" object is
embedded.
So I actually need both lookups, vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup() and the
lookup in ttm_ref_object_base_unref()? Ugh.. but ok, I will leave the
function then as it is now but remove the comment.

Yes. This seems odd, but IIRC the lookups are from different hash tables. The unref() call
makes a lookup in a hash table private to the file.


          return ttm_ref_object_base_unref(vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile,
                                           arg->handle,
                                           TTM_REF_USAGE);
@@ -551,18 +568,6 @@ int vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(struct ttm_object_file
*tfile,
          return 0;
   }

-int vmw_user_dmabuf_reference(struct ttm_object_file *tfile,
-                             struct vmw_dma_buffer *dma_buf)
-{
-       struct vmw_user_dma_buffer *user_bo;
-
-       if (dma_buf->base.destroy != vmw_user_dmabuf_destroy)
-               return -EINVAL;
-
-       user_bo = container_of(dma_buf, struct vmw_user_dma_buffer, dma);
-       return ttm_ref_object_add(tfile, &user_bo->base, TTM_REF_USAGE,
NULL);
-}
-
   /*
    * Stream management
    */
--
1.8.3.4

Otherwise looks OK to me.
Thanks!
David
_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
dri-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel




[Index of Archives]     [Linux DRI Users]     [Linux Intel Graphics]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]     [XFree86]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]     [XFree86]
  Powered by Linux