Hi!
On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 02:42:18PM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 09:38:22AM -0400, Peilin Ye wrote:
> > > Hi all,
> > >
> > > syzbot has reported [1] a global out-of-bounds read issue in
> > > fbcon_get_font(). A malicious user may resize `vc_font.height` to a large
> > > value in vt_ioctl(), causing fbcon_get_font() to overflow our built-in
> > > font data buffers, declared in lib/fonts/font_*.c:
> ...
> > > (drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c)
> > > if (font->width <= 8) {
> > > j = vc->vc_font.height;
> > > + if (font->charcount * j > FNTSIZE(fontdata))
> > > + return -EINVAL;
>
> Can that still go wrong because the multiply wraps?
Thank you for bringing this up!
The resizing of `vc_font.height` happened in vt_resizex():
(drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c)
if (v.v_clin > 32)
return -EINVAL;
[...]
for (i = 0; i < MAX_NR_CONSOLES; i++) {
[...]
if (v.v_clin)
vcp->vc_font.height = v.v_clin;
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
It does check if `v.v_clin` is greater than 32. And, currently, all
built-in fonts have a `charcount` of 256.
Therefore, for built-in fonts and resizing happened in vt_resizex(), it
cannot cause an interger overflow.
However I am not very sure about user-provided fonts, and if there are
other functions that can resize `height` or even `charcount` to a really
huge value, but I will do more investigation and think about it.
Thank you,
Peilin Ye
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