arg.version is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c:4526 vmw_execbuf_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'copy_offset' [w] Fix this by sanitizing arg.version before using it to index copy_offset Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c index 1f13457..ad91c6e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ * **************************************************************************/ #include <linux/sync_file.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include "vmwgfx_drv.h" #include "vmwgfx_reg.h" @@ -4520,8 +4521,10 @@ int vmw_execbuf_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, unsigned long data, return -EINVAL; } - if (arg.version > 1 && - copy_from_user(&arg.context_handle, + if (arg.version >= ARRAY_SIZE(copy_offset)) + return -EFAULT; + arg.version = array_index_nospec(arg.version, ARRAY_SIZE(copy_offset)); + if (copy_from_user(&arg.context_handle, (void __user *) (data + copy_offset[0]), copy_offset[arg.version - 1] - copy_offset[0]) != 0) -- 2.7.4 _______________________________________________ dri-devel mailing list dri-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
