On Tue, Jul 31, 2018 at 2:46 AM, Christian König
<christian.koenig@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> Am 30.07.2018 um 22:14 schrieb Alex Deucher:
>>
>> On Mon, Jul 30, 2018 at 5:55 AM, Michel Dänzer <michel@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 2018-07-24 10:53 PM, Alex Deucher wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Jul 23, 2018 at 12:32 PM, Gustavo A. R. Silva
>>>> <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> idx can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a
>>>>> potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
>>>>>
>>>>> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
>>>>>
>>>>> drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_pm.c:408 amdgpu_set_pp_force_state()
>>>>> warn: potential spectre issue 'data.states'
>>>>>
>>>>> Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index data.states
>>>>
>>>> Is this actually necessary? We already check that idx is valid a few
>>>> lines before:
>>>> if (ret || idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(data.states)) {
>>>> count = -EINVAL;
>>>> goto fail;
>>>> }
>>>
>>> A Spectre attack would be based on idx ending up too large, but the CPU
>>> speculatively executing the following code assuming idx <
>>> ARRAY_SIZE(data.states), and extracting information from the incorrectly
>>> speculated code via side channels.
>>>
>>> I'm not sure if that's actually possible in this case, but better safe
>>> than sorry?
>>
>> Yeah, I'm not sure. I guess this can't hurt.
>
>
> Well is idx actually controlable by userspace in an IOCTL? I guess the
> answer is no.
>
> On the other hand the array_index_nospec() macro makes the overhead absolute
> negligible.
>
> So I agree that we should be better safe than sorry.
Ok. Applied.
Thanks,
Alex
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