[PATCH 1/2] drm/radeon: forbid mapping of userptr bo through radeon device file

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Allowing userptr bo which are basicly a list of page from some vma
(so either anonymous page or file backed page) would lead to serious
corruption of kernel structures and counters (because we overwrite
the page->mapping field when mapping buffer).

This will already block if the buffer was populated before anyone does
try to mmap it because then TTM_PAGE_FLAG_SG would be set in in the
ttm_tt flags. But that flag is check before ttm_tt_populate in the ttm
vm fault handler.

So to be safe just add a check to verify_access() callback.

Signed-off-by: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c
index 7dddfdc..90f7394 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c
@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ static int radeon_verify_access(struct ttm_buffer_object *bo, struct file *filp)
 {
 	struct radeon_bo *rbo = container_of(bo, struct radeon_bo, tbo);
 
+	if (radeon_ttm_tt_has_userptr(bo->ttm))
+		return -EPERM;
 	return drm_vma_node_verify_access(&rbo->gem_base.vma_node, filp);
 }
 
-- 
2.1.0

_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
dri-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel




[Index of Archives]     [Linux DRI Users]     [Linux Intel Graphics]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]     [XFree86]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]     [XFree86]
  Powered by Linux