Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected

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On Mon Sep 23, 2024 at 5:04 PM EEST, Mikulas Patocka wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, 22 Sep 2024, luca.boccassi@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
>
> > From: Luca Boccassi <bluca@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > 
> > If enabled, we fallback to the platform keyring if the trusted keyring doesn't have
> > the key used to sign the roothash. But if pkcs7_verify() rejects the key for other
> > reasons, such as usage restrictions, we do not fallback. Do so.
> > 
> > Follow-up for 6fce1f40e95182ebbfe1ee3096b8fc0b37903269
> > 
> > Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Hi
>
> I'm not an expert in keyrings.
>
> I added keyring maintainers to the CC. Please review this patch and 
> Ack/Nack it.
>
> Mikulas
>
> > ---
> >  drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 2 +-
> >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c
> > index d351d7d39c60..a9e2c6c0a33c 100644
> > --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c
> > +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c
> > @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len,
> >  #endif
> >  				VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING
> > -	if (ret == -ENOKEY)
> > +	if (ret == -ENOKEY || ret == -EKEYREJECTED)
> >  		ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_len, sig_data,
> >  					sig_len,
> >  					VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
> > -- 
> > 2.39.5
> > 

I know nothing about dm-verity. What does it even do?

BR, Jarkko





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