On Fri, 15 Jul 2022, Daniil Lunev wrote: > Hi Mike, > Thank you for your response. I should have probably added more context > to the commit message that I specified in the cover letter. The idea is to > prohibit access of all userspace, including the root. The main concern here > is potential system applications' vulnerabilities that can trick the system to > operate on non-intended files with elevated permissions. While those could > also be exploited to get more access to the regular file systems, those firstly > has to be useable by userspace for normal system operation (e.g. to store > user data), secondly, never contain plain text secrets. Swap content is a > different story - access to it can leak very sensitive information, which > otherwise is never available as plaintext on any persistent media - e.g. raw > user secrets, raw disk encryption keys etc, other security related tokens. > Thus we propose a mechanism to enable such a lockdown after necessary > configuration has been done to the device at boot time. > --Daniil If someone gains root, he can do anything on the system. I'm quite skeptical about these attempts; protecting the system from the root user is never-ending whack-a-mole game. Mikulas -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@xxxxxxxxxx https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
