Hi Milan,
On Fri, Mar 18, 2022 at 12:29:06PM +0100, Milan Broz wrote:
On 18/03/2022 11:34, Coiby Xu wrote:
With kdump enabled, when kernel crashes, the system could boot into the
kdump kernel and dump the memory image i.e. /proc/vmcore to a specified
target. Currently, when dumping vmcore to a LUKS encrypted device, there
are two problems,
- for some machines, the user may don't have a chance enter the password
to decrypt the device after kernel crashes and kdump initrd is loaded
- LUKS2 by default use the memory-hard Argon2 key derivation function
which is quite memory-consuming compared to the limited memory reserved
for kdump. Take Fedora example, by default, only 256M is reserved for
systems having memory between 4G-64G. With LUKS enabled, ~1300M needs
to be reserved for kdump.
Besides the users (at least for Fedora) usually expect kdump to work out
of the box i.e. no manual password input is needed. And it doesn't make
sense to derivate the master key again in kdump kernel which seems to be
redundant work.
Based on Milan's feedback [1] on Kairui's ideas to support kdump with
LUKS encryption, this patch set addresses the above issues by
Hi,
I think you are creating another attack vector here, storing the encryption
key to yet another place... but I already mentioned that in the referenced mail.
Thanks for the quick response! I thought the take-home message of the
referenced is we shouldn't leave the master key in the user space. Sorry
I seem to still misunderstand what's mentioned in the referenced mail. But
take AES as an example, my reasoning is as follows:
the expanded key has already been stored in "struct crypto_aes_ctx".
If a hacker can somehow access the master key stored in the memory
reserved exclusively for kdump, it means he/she can also access the
expanded key stored in struct crypto_aes_ctx. So not creating
another attack vector?
Why is it not done through keyring and forcing kdump to retain key there
(under the same keyring key name as dm-crypt used)?
Kernel dm-crypt supports this already; LUKS2 uses keyring by default too.
That's all you need, or not? Why do you need to add another "kdump:" thing?
IOW why kdump cannot copy the key to keyring under the name dm-crypt
has in the mapping table and let dm-crypt activate the device almost without
code changes?
Sorry, I haven't explained how kdump works. Once the 1st kernel crashes and
the system boots into the kdump kernel, the kdump kernel only have direct
access to the memory exclusively reserved for it i.e. the kdump kernel
loses the direct access to the keyring constructed in the 1st kernel. In
theory, the kdump kernel could do some "hacking" to find out the key
stored in the memory directly managed by the 1st kernel but I imagine
this would be difficult task (imagine I present the memory dump of my
computer to you and ask you to rebuild all the relevant kernel data
structures and find the key). Besides, it's not reliable to read the
memory directly managed by the first kernel for example the memory could
be corrupt. So we have to pass the master key from the 1st kernel to the kdump
kernel.
Btw, if we store the key in the kernel keyring, doesn't it mean storing the
"encryption key to another place" and thus creating "another attach vector"?
Anyway, please fix the naming before this patchset can be read or reviewed!
LUKS is user-space key management only (on-disk metadata); the kernel has
no idea how the key is derived or what LUKS is - dm-crypt only knows the key
(either through keyring or directly in the mapping table).
Polluting kernel namespace with "luks" names variables is wrong - dm-crypt
is used in many other mappings (plain, bitlocker, veracrypt, ...)
Just use the dm-crypt key, do not reference LUKS at all.
Thanks for pointing out my mistake of misusing the word LUKS! I'll fix this
error once we settle down what's the correct approach to reuse master
key for the kdump kernel.
Milan
1) first saving the LUKS master key to kexec when opening the encrypted
device
2) then saving the master key to the reserved memory for kdump when
loading kdump kernel image.
So the LUKS master key never leaves the kernel space and once the key has
been saved to the reserved memory for kdump, it would be wiped
immediately. If there is no security concern with this approach or any
other concern, I will drop the following assumptions made for this RFC
version in v1,
- only x86 is supported
- there is only one LUKS device for the system
to extend the support to other architectures including POWER, ARM and
s390x and address the case of multiple LUKS devices. Any feedback will be
appreciated, thanks!
For a proof of concept, I've patched cryptsetup [2] in a quick-and-dirty
way to support a new option "--kdump-kernel-master-key"
and hacked systemd [3]. It works for Fedora 34.
[1] https://yhbt.net/lore/all/e5abd089-3398-fdb4-7991-0019be434b79@xxxxxxxxx/
[2] https://gitlab.com/coxu/cryptsetup/-/commit/ee54bb15445da0bc3f9155a7227a9799da4dac20
[3] https://github.com/coiby/systemd/tree/reuse_kdump_master_key
Coiby Xu (4):
kexec, dm-crypt: receive LUKS master key from dm-crypt and pass it to
kdump
kdump, x86: pass the LUKS master key to kdump kernel using a kernel
command line parameter luksmasterkey
crash_dump: retrieve LUKS master key in kdump kernel
dm-crypt: reuse LUKS master key in kdump kernel
arch/x86/include/asm/crash.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 7 ++++
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 26 +++++++++---
include/linux/crash_dump.h | 4 ++
include/linux/kexec.h | 7 ++++
kernel/crash_dump.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/kexec_core.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 215 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--
Best regards,
Coiby
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