Relocate the twin mce functions to arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
file where they belong.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 52 -------------------------------
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/set_memory.h | 9 +++---
3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
index ff0f2d90338a..648be0bd20df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
@@ -88,56 +88,4 @@ void notify_range_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-/*
- * Prevent speculative access to the page by either unmapping
- * it (if we do not require access to any part of the page) or
- * marking it uncacheable (if we want to try to retrieve data
- * from non-poisoned lines in the page).
- */
-static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
-{
- unsigned long decoy_addr;
- int rc;
-
- /* SGX pages are not in the 1:1 map */
- if (arch_is_platform_page(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT))
- return 0;
- /*
- * We would like to just call:
- * set_memory_XX((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
- * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
- * speculative access to the poison page because we'd have
- * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
- * around in registers.
- * Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address
- * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
- * This relies on set_memory_XX() properly sanitizing any __pa()
- * results with __PHYSICAL_MASK or PTE_PFN_MASK.
- */
- decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
-
- if (unmap)
- rc = set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1);
- else
- rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1);
- if (rc)
- pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
- return rc;
-}
-#define set_mce_nospec set_mce_nospec
-
-/* Restore full speculative operation to the pfn. */
-static inline int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
-{
- return set_memory_wb((unsigned long) pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
-}
-#define clear_mce_nospec clear_mce_nospec
-#else
-/*
- * Few people would run a 32-bit kernel on a machine that supports
- * recoverable errors because they have too much memory to boot 32-bit.
- */
-#endif
-
#endif /* _ASM_X86_SET_MEMORY_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index 042cfac6272b..9abc6077d768 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -1925,6 +1925,54 @@ int set_memory_wb(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_memory_wb);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+/*
+ * Prevent speculative access to the page by either unmapping
+ * it (if we do not require access to any part of the page) or
+ * marking it uncacheable (if we want to try to retrieve data
+ * from non-poisoned lines in the page).
+ */
+int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
+{
+ unsigned long decoy_addr;
+ int rc;
+
+ /* SGX pages are not in the 1:1 map */
+ if (arch_is_platform_page(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT))
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * We would like to just call:
+ * set_memory_XX((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
+ * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
+ * speculative access to the poison page because we'd have
+ * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
+ * around in registers.
+ * Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address
+ * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
+ * This relies on set_memory_XX() properly sanitizing any __pa()
+ * results with __PHYSICAL_MASK or PTE_PFN_MASK.
+ */
+ decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
+
+ if (unmap)
+ rc = set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1);
+ else
+ rc = set_memory_uc(decoy_addr, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
+ return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_mce_nospec);
+
+/* Restore full speculative operation to the pfn. */
+int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ return set_memory_wb((unsigned long) pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_mce_nospec);
+
+#endif
+
int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
{
if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX))
diff --git a/include/linux/set_memory.h b/include/linux/set_memory.h
index f36be5166c19..d6263d7afb55 100644
--- a/include/linux/set_memory.h
+++ b/include/linux/set_memory.h
@@ -42,20 +42,21 @@ static inline bool can_set_direct_map(void)
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */
-#ifndef set_mce_nospec
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap);
+int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn);
+#else
static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
{
return 0;
}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef clear_mce_nospec
static inline int clear_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
+
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
static inline int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
{
--
2.18.4
--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@xxxxxxxxxx
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
