> From: Roberto Sassu [mailto:roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx] > Sent: Friday, December 3, 2021 11:20 AM > > From: Christoph Hellwig [mailto:hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] > > Sent: Friday, December 3, 2021 7:52 AM > > On Thu, Dec 02, 2021 at 09:29:52AM +0000, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > > The problem being solved is how to grant access to files > > > which satisfy a property defined in the policy. > > > > If you have want to enforce access to files in the block layer using > > a specific stacking block driver you don't just have one layering > > violation but a bunch of them. Please go back to the drawing board. > > Ok. I write my thoughts here, so that it is easier to align. > > dm-verity provides block-level integrity, which means that > the block layer itself is responsible to not pass data to the > upper layer, the filesystem, if a block is found corrupted. > > The dm-verity root digest represents the immutable state > of the block device. dm-verity is still responsible to enforce > accesses to the block device according to the root digest > passed at device setup time. Nothing changes, the block > layer still detects data corruption against the passed > reference value. > > The task of the security layer is to decide whether or not > the root digest passed at device setup time is acceptable, > e.g. it represents a device containing genuine files coming > from a software vendor. > > The mandatory policy can be enforced at different layers, > depending on whether the security controls are placed. > A possibility would be to deny mounting block devices that > don't satisfy the mandatory policy. > > However, if the mandatory policy wants only to restrict > execution of approved files and allowing the rest, making > the decision at the block layer is too coarse and restrictive. > It would force the user to mount only approved block > devices. The security layer must operate on files to enforce > this policy. > > Now probably there is the part where there is no agreement. > > The integrity property of a block device applies also to the > files on the filesystem mounted from that device. User space > programs cannot access files in that filesystem coming from a > device with a different dm-verity root digest, or files stored > in a corrupted block device. > > If what I wrote is correct, that the integrity property is preserved > across the layers, this would give enough flexibility to enforce > policies at a higher layer, although that property is guaranteed > by a lower layer. Hi Christoph did I address your concerns? If yes, I could send the new patch set, including the patch that uses the new functionality. Thanks Roberto HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063 Managing Director: Li Peng, Zhong Ronghua -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@xxxxxxxxxx https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
