key_request accepts a key type as its first argument. If it returns a valid pointer, it should always have this same requested key type. Indeed other request_key users surveyed such as dm-crypt, ecryptfs and fscrypt v1 also don't check the key type. Therefore drop the apparently unneeded check. Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- To: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx> To: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx> To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@xxxxxxxxxx> To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@xxxxxxxxxx> To: dm-devel@xxxxxxxxxx To: Song Liu <song@xxxxxxxxxx> To: Richard Weinberger <richard@xxxxxx> Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: linux-raid@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: keyrings@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: linux-mtd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: linux-integrity@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx --- fs/ubifs/auth.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c index e564d5ff8781..6a0b8d858d81 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c @@ -286,12 +286,6 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c) down_read(&keyring_key->sem); - if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) { - ubifs_err(c, "key type must be logon"); - err = -ENOKEY; - goto out; - } - ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key); if (!ukp) { /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */ -- git-series 0.9.1 -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@xxxxxxxxxx https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel