On Sat, Dec 12, 2020 at 1:03 PM Tushar Sugandhi
<tusharsu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data
> at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided
> by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem
> provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate
> the policy contents at runtime.
>
> Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook
> ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can
> be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of
> the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry.
>
> Add "selinux" to the list of supported data sources maintained by IMA
> to enable measuring SELinux data.
>
> To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
>
> 1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
> to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
> For example,
> BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
>
> 2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
> measure func=CRITICAL_DATA data_source=selinux
>
> Sample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy:
>
> To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run
> the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
>
> sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1
>
> grep "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6
>
> Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading
> the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe
> system and run the sha256sum /sys/kernel/selinux/policy there to get
> the expected hash.
>
> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@xxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 +-
> security/selinux/Makefile | 2 +
> security/selinux/include/security.h | 11 +++-
> security/selinux/measure.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++----
> 5 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
...
> diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
> index 4d8e0e8adf0b..83d512116341 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/Makefile
> +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
> @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
>
> selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o
>
> +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o
Naming things is hard, I get that, but I would prefer if we just
called this file "ima.c" or something similar. The name "measure.c"
implies a level of abstraction or general use which simply doesn't
exist here. Let's help make it a bit more obvious what should belong
in this file.
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> index 3cc8bab31ea8..18ee65c98446 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> @@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state,
> struct selinux_policy *policy);
> int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
> void **data, size_t *len);
> -
> +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state,
> + void **data, size_t *len);
> int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
> unsigned int req_cap);
>
> @@ -446,4 +447,12 @@ extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
> extern void hashtab_cache_init(void);
> extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
> +extern void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state);
> +#else
> +static inline void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state)
> +{
> +}
> +#endif
If you are going to put the SELinux/IMA function(s) into a separate
source file, please put the function declarations into a separate
header file too. For example, look at
security/selinux/include/{netif,netnode,netport,etc.}.h.
> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..b7e24358e11d
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem.
> + */
> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> +#include <linux/ktime.h>
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
> +#include "security.h"
> +
> +/*
> + * This function creates a unique name by appending the timestamp to
> + * the given string. This string is passed as "event_name" to the IMA
> + * hook to measure the given SELinux data.
> + *
> + * The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have
> + * already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier).
> + * But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence
> + * needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass a unique "event_name"
> + * to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data.
> + *
> + * For example,
> + * At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it.
> + * At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it.
> + * At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it
> + * (since it was already measured) unless the event_name, for instance,
> + * is different in this call.
> + */
> +static char *selinux_event_name(const char *name_prefix)
> +{
> + struct timespec64 cur_time;
> +
> + ktime_get_real_ts64(&cur_time);
> + return kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s-%lld:%09ld", name_prefix,
> + cur_time.tv_sec, cur_time.tv_nsec);
> +}
Why is this a separate function? It's three lines long and only
called from selinux_measure_state(). Do you ever see the SELinux/IMA
code in this file expanding to the point where this function is nice
from a reuse standpoint?
Also, I assume you are not concerned about someone circumventing the
IMA measurements by manipulating the time? In most systems I would
expect the time to be a protected entity, but with many systems
getting their time from remote systems I thought it was worth
mentioning.
> +/*
> + * selinux_measure_state - Measure hash of the SELinux policy
> + *
> + * @state: selinux state struct
> + *
> + * NOTE: This function must be called with policy_mutex held.
> + */
> +void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state)
Similar to the name of this source file, let's make it clear this is
for IMA. How about calling this selinux_ima_measure_state() or
similar?
> +{
> + void *policy = NULL;
> + char *policy_event_name = NULL;
> + size_t policy_len;
> + int rc = 0;
> + bool initialized = selinux_initialized(state);
Why bother with the initialized variable? Unless I'm missing
something it is only used once in the code below.
> + /*
> + * Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed.
> + */
> + if (!initialized)
> + goto out;
> +
> + policy_event_name = selinux_event_name("selinux-policy-hash");
> + if (!policy_event_name) {
> + pr_err("SELinux: %s: event name for policy not allocated.\n",
> + __func__);
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
This function doesn't return an error code, why bother with setting
the rc variable here?
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + rc = security_read_policy_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len);
> + if (rc) {
> + pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed to read policy %d.\n", __func__, rc);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ima_measure_critical_data("selinux", policy_event_name,
> + policy, policy_len, true);
> +
> + vfree(policy);
> +
> +out:
> + kfree(policy_event_name);
> +}
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index 9704c8a32303..dfa2e00894ae 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -2180,6 +2180,7 @@ static void selinux_notify_policy_change(struct selinux_state *state,
> selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
> selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
> selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
> + selinux_measure_state(state);
> }
>
> void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state,
> @@ -3875,8 +3876,33 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
>
> +/**
> + * security_read_selinux_policy - read the policy.
> + * @policy: SELinux policy
> + * @data: binary policy data
> + * @len: length of data in bytes
> + *
> + */
> +static int security_read_selinux_policy(struct selinux_policy *policy,
> + void *data, size_t *len)
Let's just call this "security_read_policy()".
> +{
> + int rc;
> + struct policy_file fp;
> +
> + fp.data = data;
> + fp.len = *len;
> +
> + rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)data;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * security_read_policy - read the policy.
> + * @state: selinux_state
> * @data: binary policy data
> * @len: length of data in bytes
> *
> @@ -3885,8 +3911,6 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
> void **data, size_t *len)
> {
> struct selinux_policy *policy;
> - int rc;
> - struct policy_file fp;
>
> policy = rcu_dereference_protected(
> state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
> @@ -3898,14 +3922,43 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
> if (!*data)> --
> 2.17.1
>
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> - fp.data = *data;
> - fp.len = *len;
> + return security_read_selinux_policy(policy, *data, len);
> +}
>
> - rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp);
> - if (rc)
> - return rc;
> +/**
> + * security_read_policy_kernel - read the policy.
> + * @state: selinux_state
> + * @data: binary policy data
> + * @len: length of data in bytes
> + *
> + * Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy.
> + * This function is for internal use only and should not
> + * be used for returning data to user space.
> + *
> + * This function must be called with policy_mutex held.
> + */
> +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state,
> + void **data, size_t *len)
Let's call this "security_read_state_kernel()".
> +{
> + struct selinux_policy *policy;
> + int rc = 0;
See below, the rc variable is not needed.
> - *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;
> - return 0;
> + policy = rcu_dereference_protected(
> + state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
> + if (!policy) {
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
Jumping to the out label is a little silly since it is just a return;
do a "return -EINVAL;" here instead.
> + }
> +
> + *len = policy->policydb.len;
> + *data = vmalloc(*len);
> + if (!*data) {
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
Same as above, "return -ENOMEM;" please.
> + }
>
> + rc = security_read_selinux_policy(policy, *data, len);
You should be able to do "return security_read_selinux_policy(...);" here.
> +
> +out:
> + return rc;
> }
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@xxxxxxxxxx
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
