IMA provides capabilities to measure file data, and in-memory buffer
data. However, various data structures, policies, and states
stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system.
Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data. These
kernel subsystems help protect the integrity of a device. Currently,
IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel subsystems to measure
their integrity critical data.
Define a new IMA hook - ima_measure_critical_data to measure kernel
integrity critical data.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index ac3d82f962f2..675f54db6264 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
+extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
+ const void *buf, int buf_len,
+ bool measure_buf_hash);
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void);
@@ -122,6 +125,9 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
}
static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
+static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
+ const void *buf, int buf_len,
+ bool measure_buf_hash) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index fa3044a7539f..7d9deda6a8b3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \
hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \
hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \
+ hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \
hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index af218babd198..9917e1730cb6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
* subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
* func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
- * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK
+ * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 0f8409d77602..dff4bce4fb09 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -922,6 +922,40 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
fdput(f);
}
+/**
+ * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data
+ * @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry
+ * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure
+ * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes)
+ * @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash
+ *
+ * Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel,
+ * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr.
+ *
+ * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change.
+ * Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures,
+ * policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrity
+ * of the system.
+ *
+ * If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data,
+ * else measure the buffer data itself.
+ * @measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured
+ * is too large.
+ *
+ * The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised.
+ */
+void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
+ const void *buf, int buf_len,
+ bool measure_buf_hash)
+{
+ if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len)
+ return;
+
+ process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name,
+ CRITICAL_DATA, 0, NULL,
+ measure_buf_hash);
+}
+
static int __init init_ima(void)
{
int error;
--
2.17.1
--
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