Currently, IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel components
to measure their data. A generic function provided by IMA would
enable various parts of the kernel with easier and faster on-boarding to
use IMA infrastructure, would avoid code duplication, and consistent
usage of IMA policy "critical_kernel_data_sources" across the kernel.
Add a new IMA func CRITICAL_DATA and a corresponding IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data() to support measuring various critical kernel
components. Limit the measurement to the components that are specified
in the IMA policy - CRITICAL_DATA+critical_kernel_data_sources.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 ++++++-
include/linux/ima.h | 11 +++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
6 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 7ccdc1964e29..36d9cee9704d 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Description:
base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
- [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK]
+ [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA]
mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
[[^]MAY_EXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ Description:
critical_kernel_data_sources:= list of kernel
components (eg, selinux|apparmor|dm-crypt) that
contain data critical to the security of the kernel.
+ Only valid when action is "measure" and func is
+ CRITICAL_DATA.
default policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
@@ -128,3 +130,7 @@ Description:
keys added to .builtin_trusted_keys or .ima keyring:
measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=.builtin_trusted_keys|.ima
+
+ Example of measure rule using CRITICAL_DATA to measure critical data
+
+ measure func=CRITICAL_DATA critical_kernel_data_sources=selinux|apparmor|dm-crypt
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index d15100de6cdd..136fc02580db 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
+extern int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
+ const char *event_data_source,
+ const void *buf, int buf_len,
+ bool measure_buf_hash);
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
@@ -104,6 +108,13 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
}
static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
+static inline int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
+ const char *event_data_source,
+ const void *buf, int buf_len,
+ bool measure_buf_hash)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index ba332de8ed0b..00b84052c8f1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \
hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \
hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \
+ hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \
hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index af218babd198..9917e1730cb6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
* subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
* func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
- * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK
+ * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 52cbbc1f7ea2..a889bf40cb7e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -869,6 +869,30 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
fdput(f);
}
+/**
+ * ima_measure_critical_data - measure critical data
+ * @event_name: name for the given data
+ * @event_data_source: name of the event data source
+ * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure
+ * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes)
+ * @measure_buf_hash: if set to true - will measure hash of the buf,
+ * instead of buf
+ *
+ * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
+ */
+int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
+ const char *event_data_source,
+ const void *buf, int buf_len,
+ bool measure_buf_hash)
+{
+ if (!event_name || !event_data_source || !buf || !buf_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name,
+ CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_data_source,
+ measure_buf_hash);
+}
+
static int __init init_ima(void)
{
int error;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index c8a044705347..0c5202c1f26e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -510,14 +510,23 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
{
int i;
- if (func == KEY_CHECK) {
- return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) &&
- ima_match_rule_data(rule, rule->keyrings, func_data,
- true, cred);
- }
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
(rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
return false;
+
+ switch (func) {
+ case KEY_CHECK:
+ return ((rule->func == func) &&
+ ima_match_rule_data(rule, rule->keyrings,
+ func_data, true, cred));
+ case CRITICAL_DATA:
+ return ((rule->func == func) &&
+ ima_match_rule_data(rule, rule->data_sources,
+ func_data, false, cred));
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
(rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
return false;
@@ -1113,6 +1122,19 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
return false;
+ break;
+ case CRITICAL_DATA:
+ if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!(entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCES) ||
+ (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
+ IMA_DATA_SOURCES)))
+ return false;
+
+ if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+ return false;
+
break;
default:
return false;
@@ -1245,6 +1267,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) &&
strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = KEY_CHECK;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CRITICAL_DATA") == 0)
+ entry->func = CRITICAL_DATA;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
--
2.17.1
--
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