> On Aug 13, 2020, at 10:42 AM, James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Thu, 2020-08-13 at 10:21 -0400, Chuck Lever wrote: >>> On Aug 12, 2020, at 11:42 AM, James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@Hans >>> enPartnership.com> wrote: > [...] >>> For most people the security mechanism of local xattrs is >>> sufficient. If you're paranoid, you don't believe it is and you >>> use EVM. >> >> When IMA metadata happens to be stored in local filesystems in >> a trusted xattr, it's going to enjoy the protection you describe >> without needing the addition of a cryptographic signature. >> >> However, that metadata doesn't live its whole life there. It >> can reside in a tar file, it can cross a network, it can live >> on a back-up tape. I think we agree that any time that metadata >> is in transit or at rest outside of a Linux local filesystem, it >> is exposed. >> >> Thus I'm interested in a metadata protection mechanism that does >> not rely on the security characteristics of a particular storage >> container. For me, a cryptographic signature fits that bill >> nicely. > > Sure, but one of the points about IMA is a separation of mechanism from > policy. Signed hashes (called appraisal in IMA terms) is just one > policy you can decide to require or not or even make it conditional on > other things. AFAICT, the current EVM_IMA_DIGSIG and EVM_PORTABLE_DIGSIG formats are always signed. The policy choice is whether or not to verify the signature, not whether or not the metadata format is signed. -- Chuck Lever chucklever@xxxxxxxxx -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
