On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 12:33 PM Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
> > On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 1:53 PM Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>
> >> Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx> writes:
> >>
> >> >> Let's just focus on reporting errors when we know we have them.
> >> >
> >> > That's the problem in my eyes. If software needs to contend with
> >> > latent error reporting then it should always contend otherwise
> >> > software has multiple error models to wrangle.
> >>
> >> The only way for an application to know that the data has been written
> >> successfully would be to issue a read after every write. That's not a
> >> performance hit most applications are willing to take. And, of course,
> >> the media can still go bad at a later time, so it only guarantees the
> >> data is accessible immediately after having been written.
> >>
> >> What I'm suggesting is that we should not complete a write successfully
> >> if we know that the data will not be retrievable. I wouldn't call this
> >> adding an extra error model to contend with. Applications should
> >> already be checking for errors on write.
> >>
> >> Does that make sense? Are we talking past each other?
> >
> > The badblock list is late to update in both directions, late to add
> > entries that the scrub needs to find and late to delete entries that
> > were inadvertently cleared by cache-line writes that did not first
> > ingest the poison for a read-modify-write.
>
> We aren't looking for perfection. If the badblocks list is populated,
> then report the error instead of letting the user write data that we
> know they won't be able to access later.
>
> You have confused me, though, since I thought that stores to bad media
> would not clear errors. Perhaps you are talking about some future
> hardware implementation that doesn't yet exist?
No, today cacheline aligned DMA, and cpu cachelines that are fully
dirtied without a demand fill can end up clearing poison. The
movdir64b instruction provides a way to force this behavior from the
cpu where it was previously luck.
> > So I see the above as being wishful in using the error list as the
> > hard source of truth and unfortunate to up-level all sub-sector error
> > entries into full PAGE_SIZE data offline events.
>
> The page size granularity is only an issue for mmap(). If you are using
> read/write, then 512 byte granularity can be achieved. Even with mmap,
> if you encounter an error on a 4k page, you can query the status of each
> sector in that page to isolate the error. So I'm not quite sure I
> understand what you're getting at.
I'm getting at the fact that we don't allow mmap on PAGE_SIZE
granularity in the presence of errors, and don't allow dax I/O to the
page when an error is present. Only non-dax direct-I/O can read /
write at sub-page granularity in the presence of errors.
The interface to query the status is not coordinated with the
filesystem, but that's a whole other discussion. Yes, we're getting a
bit off in the weeds.
> > I'm hoping we can find a way to make the error handling more fine
> > grained over time, but for the current patch, managing the blast
> > radius as PAGE_SIZE granularity at least matches the zero path with
> > the write path.
>
> I think the write path can do 512 byte granularity, not page size.
> Anyway, I think we've gone far enough off into the weeds that more
> patches will have to be posted for debate. :)
>
It can't, see dax_iomap_actor(). That call to dax_direct_access() will
fail if it hits a known badblock.
> >> > Setting that aside we can start with just treating zeroing the same as
> >> > the copy_from_iter() case and fail the I/O at the dax_direct_access()
> >> > step.
> >>
> >> OK.
> >>
> >> > I'd rather have a separate op that filesystems can use to clear errors
> >> > at block allocation time that can be enforced to have the correct
> >> > alignment.
> >>
> >> So would file systems always call that routine instead of zeroing, or
> >> would they first check to see if there are badblocks?
> >
> > The proposal is that filesystems distinguish zeroing from free-block
> > allocation/initialization such that the fsdax implementation directs
> > initialization to a driver callback. This "initialization op" would
> > take care to check for poison and clear it. All other dax paths would
> > not consult the badblocks list.
>
> What do you mean by "all other dax paths?" Would that include
> mmap/direct_access? Because that definitely should still consult the
> badblocks list.
dax_direct_access() consults the badblock list,
dax_copy_{to,from}_iter() do not, and badblocks discovered after a
page is mapped do not invalidate the page unless the poison is
consumed.
> I'm not against having a separate operation for clearing errors, but I
> guess I'm not convinced it's cleaner, either.
The idea with a separate op is to have an explicit ABI to clear errors
like page-aligned-hole-punch (FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_ERROR?) vs some implicit
side effect of direct-I/O writes.
I also feel like we're heading in a direction that tries to avoid
relying on the cpu machine-check recovery path at all costs. That's
the kernel's prerogative, of course, but it seems like at a minimum
we're not quite on the same page about what role machine-check
recovery plays in the error handling model.
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