Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support

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On Sun, Aug 11, 2019 at 01:12:56PM +0200, Milan Broz wrote:
> On 10/08/2019 06:39, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > Truncated IVs are a huge issue, since we already expose the correct
> > API via AF_ALG (without any restrictions on how many of the IV bits
> > are populated), and apparently, if your AF_ALG request for xts(aes)
> > happens to be fulfilled by the CAAM driver and your implementation
> > uses more than 64 bits for the IV, the top bits get truncated silently
> > and your data might get eaten.
> 
> Actually, I think we have already serious problem with in in kernel (no AF_ALG needed).
> 
> I do not have the hardware, but please could you check that dm-crypt big-endian IV
> (plain64be) produces the same output on CAAM?
> 
> It is 64bit IV, but big-endian and we use size of cipher block (16bytes) here,
> so the first 8 bytes are zero in this case.
> 
> I would expect data corruption in comparison to generic implementation,
> if it supports only the first 64bit...
> 
> Try this:
> 
> # create small null device of 8 sectors,  we use zeroes as fixed ciphertext
> dmsetup create zero --table "0 8 zero"
> 
> # create crypt device on top of it (with some key), using plain64be IV
> dmsetup create crypt --table "0 8 crypt aes-xts-plain64be e8cfa3dbfe373b536be43c5637387786c01be00ba5f730aacb039e86f3eb72f3 0 /dev/mapper/zero 0"
> 
> # and compare it with and without your driver, this is what I get here:
> # sha256sum /dev/mapper/crypt 
> 532f71198d0d84d823b8e410738c6f43bc3e149d844dd6d37fa5b36d150501e1  /dev/mapper/crypt
> # dmsetup remove crypt
> 
> You can try little-endian version (plain64), this should always work even with CAAM
> dmsetup create crypt --table "0 8 crypt aes-xts-plain64 e8cfa3dbfe373b536be43c5637387786c01be00ba5f730aacb039e86f3eb72f3 0 /dev/mapper/zero 0"
> 
> # sha256sum /dev/mapper/crypt 
> f17abd27dedee4e539758eabdb6c15fa619464b509cf55f16433e6a25da42857  /dev/mapper/crypt
> # dmsetup remove crypt
> 
> # dmsetup remove zero
> 
> 
> If you get different plaintext in the first case, your driver is actually creating
> data corruption in this configuration and it should be fixed!
> (Only the first sector must be the same, because it has IV == 0.)
> 
> Milan
> 
> p.s.
> If you ask why we have this IV, it was added per request to allow map some chipset-based
> encrypted drives directly. I guess it is used for some data forensic things.
> 

Also, if the CAAM driver is really truncating the IV for "xts(aes)", it should
already be failing the extra crypto self-tests, since the fuzz testing in
test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl() uses random IVs.

- Eric

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