Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] md/dm-crypt - switch to AES library for EBOIV

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 06/08/2019 10:02, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> The EBOIV IV mode reuses the same AES encryption key that is used for
> encrypting the data, and uses it to perform a single block encryption
> of the byte offset to produce the IV.
> 
> Since table-based AES is known to be susceptible to known-plaintext
> attacks on the key, and given that the same key is used to encrypt
> the byte offset (which is known to an attacker), we should be
> careful not to permit arbitrary instantiations where the allocated
> AES cipher is provided by aes-generic or other table-based drivers
> that are known to be time variant and thus susceptible to this kind
> of attack.
> 
> Instead, let's switch to the new AES library, which has a D-cache
> footprint that is only 1/32th of the generic AES driver, and which
> contains some mitigations to reduce the timing variance even further.

NACK.

We discussed here that we will not limit combinations inside dm-crypt.
For generic crypto API, this policy should be different, but I really
do not want these IVs to be visible outside of dm-crypt.

Allowing arbitrary combinations of a cipher, mode, and IV is how dm-crypt
works since the beginning, and I really do not see the reason to change it.

This IV mode is intended to be used for accessing old BitLocker images,
so I do not care about performance much.

Thanks,
Milan

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@xxxxxxxxxx
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel



[Index of Archives]     [DM Crypt]     [Fedora Desktop]     [ATA RAID]     [Fedora Marketing]     [Fedora Packaging]     [Fedora SELinux]     [Yosemite Discussion]     [KDE Users]     [Fedora Docs]

  Powered by Linux