> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Friday, July 19, 2019 7:35 AM
> To: Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; Milan Broz <gmazyland@xxxxxxxxx>; Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@xxxxxxx>; linux-
> crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; dm-devel@xxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: xts fuzz testing and lack of ciphertext stealing support
>
> I would argue that these cases are diametrically opposite: you
> proposed to remove support for zero length input vectors from the
> entire crypto API to prevent your driver from having to deal with
> inputs that the hardware cannot handle.
>
I did not propose any such thing - I just proposed to make zero length hash support *optional*
(i.e. don't fail and disable the driver on it) as it's totally irrelevant for 99.99999% of use cases.
(including *all* use cases I consider relevant for HW acceleration)
> I am proposing not to add support for cases that we have no need for.
>
While you are proposing to stick with an implementation that can only deal with 6.25% (1/16th) of
*legal* input data for XTS and fails on the remaining 93.75%. That's hardly a corner case anymore.
> XTS without CTS is indistinguishable from XTS with CTS if the inputs
> are always a multiple of the block size, and in 12 years, nobody has
> ever raised the issue that our support is limited to that. So what
> problem are we fixing by changing this? dm-crypt does not care,
> fscrypt does not care, userland does not care (given that it does not
> work today and we are only finding out now due to some fuzz test
> failing on CAAM)
>
If it's not supported, then it cannot be used. Most people would not start complaining about that,
they would just roll their own locally or they'd give up and/or use something else.
So the fact that it's currently not being used does not mean a whole lot. Also, it does not mean
that there will not be a relevant use case tomorrow. (and I can assure you there *are* definitely
real-life use cases, so I have to assume these are currently handled outside of the base kernel)
In any case, if you try to use XTS you would *expect* it to work for any input >= 16 bytes as that's
how the algorithm is *specified*. Without the CTS part it's simply not XTS.
> > I pretty much made the same argument about all these driver workarounds
> > slowing down my driver fast path but that was considered a non-issue.
> >
> > In this particular case, it should not need to be more than:
> >
> > if (unlikely(size & 15)) {
> > xts_with_partial_last_block();
> > } else {
> > xts_with_only_full_blocks();
> > }
> >
>
> Of course. But why add this at all if it is known to be dead code?
>
But that's just an assumption and assumptions are the root of all evil ;-)
Regards,
Pascal van Leeuwen
Silicon IP Architect, Multi-Protocol Engines @ Verimatrix
www.insidesecure.com
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