On 25/06/2019 20:20, Mike Snitzer wrote: > On Wed, Jun 19 2019 at 3:10pm -0400, > Jaskaran Khurana <jaskarankhurana@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> The verification is to support cases where the roothash is not secured by >> Trusted Boot, UEFI Secureboot or similar technologies. >> One of the use cases for this is for dm-verity volumes mounted after boot, >> the root hash provided during the creation of the dm-verity volume has to >> be secure and thus in-kernel validation implemented here will be used >> before we trust the root hash and allow the block device to be created. >> >> The signature being provided for verification must verify the root hash and >> must be trusted by the builtin keyring for verification to succeed. >> >> The hash is added as a key of type "user" and the description is passed to >> the kernel so it can look it up and use it for verification. >> >> Kernel commandline parameter will indicate whether to check (only if >> specified) or force (for all dm verity volumes) roothash signature >> verification. >> >> Kernel commandline: dm_verity.verify_sig=1 or 2 for check/force root hash >> signature validation respectively. >> >> Signed-off-by: Jaskaran Khurana <jaskarankhurana@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Milan and/or others: could you please provide review and if you're OK > with this patch respond accordingly? Stand by please :) I like the patch, I think all major problems were solved, but I still need to test it somehow. Anyway, for the time being, I keep all ongoing patches that need some later userspace support in my branch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mbroz/linux.git/log/?h=dm-cryptsetup so at least it get some automated testing. Milan -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
