Re: [PATCH] dm crypt: wipe kernel key copy after IV initialization

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On 01/12/2018 04:30 PM, Ondrej Kozina wrote:
> Loading key via kernel keyring service we erase internal
> key copy immediately after we pass it in crypto layer. This is
> wrong because IV is initialised later and we use wrong key
> for the initialization (instead of real key there's just zeroed
> block).
> 
> The bug may cause data corruption if key is loaded via kernel keyring
> service first and later same crypt device is reactivated using exactly
> same key in hexbyte representation, or vice versa. The bug (and fix)
> affects only ciphers using following IVs: essiv, lmk and tcw.
> 
> Fixes: c538f6ec9f56 ("dm crypt: add ability to use keys from the kernel
> key retention service")
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@xxxxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@xxxxxxxxx>

Mike, this patch should go into 4.15 final.

Actually I think this is the second most serious data corruption fix for dm-crypt
in the last years (the first one was wonderful RAID readahead bug we fixed "by mistake"
just by reordering code :-)

Once it is in mainline, we can release cryptsetup2 that disables using of keyring
for older kernels.

Thanks,
Milan



> ---
>  drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 12 ++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
> index 9fc12f5..334b0a3 100644
> --- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
> +++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
> @@ -2053,9 +2053,6 @@ static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string
>  
>  	ret = crypt_setkey(cc);
>  
> -	/* wipe the kernel key payload copy in each case */
> -	memset(cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
> -
>  	if (!ret) {
>  		set_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
>  		kzfree(cc->key_string);
> @@ -2523,6 +2520,10 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key)
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> +	/* wipe the kernel key payload copy */
> +	if (cc->key_string)
> +		memset(cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
> +
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> @@ -2961,6 +2962,9 @@ static int crypt_message(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
>  				return ret;
>  			if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->init)
>  				ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->init(cc);
> +			/* wipe the kernel key payload copy */
> +			if (cc->key_string)
> +				memset(cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
>  			return ret;
>  		}
>  		if (argc == 2 && !strcasecmp(argv[1], "wipe")) {
> @@ -3007,7 +3011,7 @@ static void crypt_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *limits)
>  
>  static struct target_type crypt_target = {
>  	.name   = "crypt",
> -	.version = {1, 18, 0},
> +	.version = {1, 18, 1},
>  	.module = THIS_MODULE,
>  	.ctr    = crypt_ctr,
>  	.dtr    = crypt_dtr,
> 

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