dmcrypt concern

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I have a question about dmcrypt. If the MK digest is the output of SHA1, wouldn't the master key be the weakest point the the setup? SHA1 one only provide 80 bits of security and that can't be changed.

All an attacker have to do is seek a collision in SHA1 to get the master key.. There would be absolutely no point in going after the password especially if you use a 512 bit hash like SHA512 or WHIRLPOOL. Those two provide 256 bits of security. The 80 bits of security for the master key is the weak point in the setup.

Am I understanding that right?

-David
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