Hi Arno, yes, you are absolutely right. If you can't trust your bootloader or some verification, you can't trust the rest of the system. Or in other words: if you don't have a starting point to trust, rest cannot be trusted. But attack vectors can be mitigated and the effort which is needed to tamper so.'s system can be increased. And in my opinion, crypto-stuff in GRUB is very straight forward. It is much easier to insert some malicious code into a initrd located on a unencrypted boot partition than inserting malicious code into the bootloader with limited capabilities. As it is not always possible to drag along your trusted-USB-bootstick, this is a (yes, more insecure but) worth considering alternative. I'll have a closer look at Milans link, never heard about the fact that GRUB is already able to deal with luks partitions, but it sounds quite interesting. Regards, Ralf On 11/19/2013 05:20 AM, Arno Wagner wrote: > On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 04:42:55 CET, Ralf Ramsauer wrote: >> Hi, >> >> just an idea, but shouldn't it be possible to implement encryption >> algorithms incl. LUKS to GRUB? > Possible, yes. But it does not help. Instead of attacking the > kernel image or the initrd, an attacker could just attack the grub > executable, which could then patch the kernel or the initrd. > >> /Then GRUB would be able to read the encryption kernel image and a >> initramfs. >> >> The initramfs itself could contain the symmetric Masterkey in order to >> decrypt the partition afterwards. No further password prompts would be >> needed. >> >> "All" that would be needed is to teach GRUB how to deal with encrypted >> partitions, what generally should be possible. >> >> The one and only parts that would stay unencrypted are the MBR and >> GRUB's stage2 or the modules. >> >> But that leads to the question if it is really necessary to hide your >> kernel and initrd? > If it is, then you need some other encryption scheme. Software-based > encryption will never be able to solve this issue. You can, for example, > have self-encrypting storage with keypad and display direcly on it > in the form of a trusted (and hopefully at least somewhat > tamper-resistant) module. > > This is not very good either, as tamper-resistance is basically > a myth unless you go to large, expensive and elaborate HSMs, > with independent power, all kinds of sensors and that are > designed by highly competent paranoids. > >> Signing your kernel and/or initrd could also prove the integrity and >> authenticity of your system. > No, it cannot. At least as long as the verification mechanism > is also on that system. > > The bottom line ist the following: For systems like dm-crypt/LUKS, > no additional protection for kernel and initrd is necessary, as > attackers that can compromise these can compromise the any possible > protection mechanisms for them as well. You can make things a > bit more expensive for attackers by rolling your own kernel and > initrd. > > But if you have this type of attackers, you need to step up your > protection to a different level, for example by investing > 50k-200k EUR for a real HSM that does your disk encryption. > > Arno > > > >> Regards, >> Ralf >> On 11/19/2013 03:52 AM, Arno Wagner wrote: >>> Hi, >>> >>> this topic crops up from time to time. First, doing this yourself >>> is hard, hard enough that if you have to ask how to do it, you >>> will find it severely challenging. >>> >>> That said, it has been done by several distros that can be installed >>> with "full root encryption". (Full disk encryption is not doable with >>> cryptsetup. That would need BIOS support.) Best get one of the >>> distros that do it. They usually just pack cryptsetup and its >>> libaries into the initrd and write some scripts around it. >>> >>> One example I use on a laptop is Linux Mint, which will just show >>> you a box to enter your encrytpion password before booting any futher. >>> I expect Debian and Ubuntu can do something similar. >>> >>> Best recommendation if you want to do something like this yourself >>> is to analyze the initrd of a distro that has it working and go from >>> there. >>> >>> Arno >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 19, 2013 at 03:20:43 CET, Trinh Van Thanh wrote: >>>> Hi all, >>>> >>>> Unencrypted boot partition is not safe for some special requirements. So I >>>> want to increase the secure level for full disk encryption using dm-crypt. >>>> Can I integrate cryptsetup in bootloader (example GRUB2) or is there any >>>> other solutions? >>>> >>>> Thanks in advanced, >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Trinh Van Thanh >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> dm-crypt mailing list >>>> dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx >>>> http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt >> _______________________________________________ >> dm-crypt mailing list >> dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx >> http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
