On Thu, May 23, 2013 at 03:27:25PM +0200, sector9@xxxxxxxx wrote: > During the boot stage is it possible for an attacker with physical > access to detect if a keyfile is used to unlock an encrypted volume? Yes, very easily. Just look at the initrd or init-script that does it. Booting with a USB/CD Linux (e.g. Knoppix) makes this easy, including the test whether the keyfile is valid. > Does it yield to protest that the keyfile is lost/unknown/destroyed when > in reality there is no keyfile but instead a regular non-keyfile > passphrase? Aehm, what are you asking? Whether you could lie about the former presence of a keyfile and claim the data is now inacessible due to its absence? That depends very much so how much technological knowledge those have that should believe it and what mechnism for its loss or destruction you propose. Also, keyfiles are not secure, so you would have to justify the low securuity level and the absebce of backups as well. Generally, I would call it a losing strategy. Arno -- Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: arno@xxxxxxxxxxx GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718 ---- There are two ways of constructing a software design: One way is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies, and the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies. The first method is far more difficult. --Tony Hoare _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
