Re: using a salt for encrypting blocks

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En réponse à Milan Broz <mbroz@xxxxxxxxxx> :
> > My idea is to cipher _all_ blocks by changing the salt.
> 
> You forgot one fundamental thing.
> 
> If an attacker can do snapshots in time (IOW he can read the
> cipher text device after user performed some changes) he has
> either physical access to the system or he has administrator
> permissions.
> 
physical access.

> This allows more powerfull attacks already (installing
> keylogger

I also use full disk encryption. 

[You can say that I don't have to care for an encrypted file, but yes, I
have to. The attacker can allways watch modified blocks, either it's
ciphered another time by FDE. the position of files doesn't change often in
a disk. So if somebody has repeated access to my FDE system, then the
password, he can know where the 100Mbyte file resides, then check which
blocks have changed on the encrypted partition.]

> modifying kernel

I'm using a TPM chip to enforce that everything in my /boot partition
(kernel, initramfs, bootloader and options) is unchanged between reboots.

> bios,

I don't really believe in that. By the way, BIOS with TPM have one part
read-only unchangeable, and TPM chips guarantee (that's its purpose) that
it's unchanged.

> ...).
> 
> If an attacker has such access nothing will help you.
> The chain is weaker somewhere else here.
>
I hope I took care all of these problems.
 
> > not so much, depending on how much data you cipher.
> > I use files of less than 100Mbytes and cipher them. On
> > close, a full recipher wouldn't take long.
> 
> Then use encryption on filesystem level (e.g. with CTR mode,
> iow stream mode) and not sector level block device encryption.
> 
I'm not sure I understand (??) A stream mode would help? With filesystem
level encryption? But maybe it's not the right mailing list if the talk goes
that way.


> ------------------- Fin du message d'origine ---------------------










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