Re: Entropy available for luksFormat during GNU/Linux installs

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Yes. Compared to /dev/random the /dev/urandom is actually a "program" with certain predictability. /dev/random collects its values from real randomness, at least better than urandom.
Look at the "man urandom":

The random number generator gathers environmental noise from device drivers and other sources into an entropy pool....

A read from the /dev/urandom device will not block waiting for more entropy.  As a result, if there is not sufficient entropy in the entropy pool, the returned values are theoretically vulnerable to a cryptographic attack  on  the  algorithms  used  by  the driver. 

But actually how weak a feature this is depends on the practical results achieved from the attacks. This may of course depend on the WILL, TIME, and SOFTWARE in use. All cryptography have weaknesses, but it takes time to get hold of them, - like it took time to crack the algoritm of simple DES. But in the end they got it.

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Heia Fedje!
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> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Heinz Diehl" <htd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re:  Entropy available for luksFormat during GNU/Linux installs
> Date: Sun, 24 Jan 2010 15:02:05 +0100
> 
> 
> On 24.01.2010, Arno Wagner wrote:
> 
> > "As  a  general rule,  /dev/urandom  should  be  used  for 
> > everything  except long-lived GPG/SSL/SSH keys."
> >  ^^^^^^
> 
> Why?
> 
> Is the output of urandom somehow more predictable than random?
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dm-crypt mailing list
> dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx
> http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt

>


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