Persistence memory attack

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Hello,
My name is Chris Miceli, and I was recently exposed to a video
describing an attack relying on persistent memory
(http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9876060-38.html <http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9876060-38.html>). I was wondering
if dm-crypt has any methods to help protect against this attack.  My
friend and I are very curious about security techniques and had some
input that I was wondering about.  Since the encryption key is
frequently used (every read and write), it should be stored in the cpu
cache.  Would there be a way to not keep the key in memory but only in
cache, like a TPM.  Is this medium of storage and less vulnerable to these
attacks?  I realize this sacrifices cache space, but the key is
probably there anyways.  What do you think?

Chris Miceli
Computer Science Junior, Louisiana State University

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