Re: Hidden volumes

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Sun, May 18, 2008 at 11:50:02PM +0200, Lurkos wrote:
> On Sun, May 18, 2008 at 4:51 PM, Arno Wagner <arno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > Incidentially, actually proving some data is encrypted is not possible
> > from the encrypted data itself, e.g. when using dm-crypt. (With LUKS
> > there is the header, which may be enough to convince a court.)
> 
> If I've right understood what you mean, using LUKS the security of the
> system decreases, because the presence of the header is enough to
> demonstrate that an encrypted content is present.

Yes, that can happen, depending on the circumstances.

> So... why use LUKS and not directly cryptsetup *without* LUKS extensions?

Whenever you do not need to hide the fact that something encrypted 
is present, LUKS gives you improved functionality, like multiple
keys and a possibility to change them. Think for example 
data-theft prevention on a laptop. You do not need to hide the 
presence of encrypted data form the thief. Also, there are
countries left, were the authorties cannot compel you to hand 
over an encryption key. Typically the reasoning is that 
you are not obliged to actively help in prosecuting yourself
or that as accused you have the right to lie. There are also
serious problems with an oblicgation to hand over keys. What
if you claim that stress made you forget them? Or that they
were on a pice of paper you managed to destroy? Or something 
like it? Can you be punished for not handing over the keys
if it is not clear whether you actually _can_ hand them over 
in the first place? 

Arno
-- 
Arno Wagner,   Dipl. Inform.,  CISSP    ---    Email: arno@xxxxxxxxxxx 
GnuPG:  ID: 1E25338F  FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C  0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F
----
Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans

If it's in the news, don't worry about it.  The very definition of 
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier 

---------------------------------------------------------------------
dm-crypt mailing list - http://www.saout.de/misc/dm-crypt/
To unsubscribe, e-mail: dm-crypt-unsubscribe@xxxxxxxx
For additional commands, e-mail: dm-crypt-help@xxxxxxxx


[Index of Archives]     [Device Mapper Devel]     [Fedora Desktop]     [ATA RAID]     [Fedora Marketing]     [Fedora Packaging]     [Fedora SELinux]     [Yosemite News]     [KDE Users]     [Fedora Tools]     [Fedora Docs]

  Powered by Linux