Re: Security against DRAM attacks

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Mikko Rauhala wrote:
> As for the currently advertised DRAM data retention, of course there's
> nothing much one can do about that (except to only keep drives mounted
> as necessary). I would like to verify though that unmapping a dm-crypt
> encrypted volume does overwrite the key memory area as is sensible, yes?
>   

I've only taken a quick look through the source, and it is certainly
imperfect since I am no kernel hacker, though this is what I find:

The dm-crypt.c code has a provision for clearing the keys, in
crypt_wipe_key(), but it's not clear that this code ever gets called.
Perhaps I just haven't found where the call comes from yet.

Also, each algorithm seems to keep its own copy of the key in each
context, and none that I looked at seemed to have any way to clear those
copies of the keys/contexts. Perhaps they are cleared elsewhere?

What is clear to me is that someone who knows more about this subsystem
than I do needs to look it over and say, yes all the keys are cleared,
or no they are not and here's a patch.


-- 
Homeland Stupidity <http://www.homelandstupidity.us/>

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