Christophe wrote:
Arno Wagner wrote:
On Wed, Oct 04, 2006 at 01:03:50AM +0200, Christophe wrote:
Hi,
I read through the mailling-list and still have a question about LUKS
and brute force attacks :
is there a way to have LUKS block any further trial at accessing the
encrypted partition after (for instance) 10 identification failure
when trying to open the encrypted partition ?
This way, brute force attack would not be possible...
thanks for your answer !
Would not help, since an attacker does not need to use the
LUKS code, but can simulate the attack.
Arno
Thx for you answer,
Still, I don't understand how he could simulate the attack, since I
thought the partition was encoded with a cipher-key.
I thought the cipher key was acessible only when you get the password
right, then acces it from the partition table.
I am sorry I dod not get deep enough into the implemantation of luks,
but still I would like to understand.
Do you pls have a hint for me of a link I could read, not about the
implementation precisely but why an attacker could / could not attack ?
thank you
Yes but in this scenario, the attacker has the old key so they can use
their old key plus the old partition header get at the key. Not sure why
they wouldn't just store the master key at the point they have
originally had access to the partition though.
-- jeek
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