Re: [dm-crypt] self-destruct mode for dm-crypt

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On Tue, 28 Mar 2006 21:24:27 -0000
"Brandon Enright" <....> wrote:

> 
> I've thought about a self destruct feature too.  It's probably something
> that would be best implemented in LUKS.  Rather than having the complication
> of trying to create a new valid file system though, I'd rather it just
> destroy the LUKS master key rendering all data completely useless.  Sure
> this might get you shot in case 1 and a maximum sentence in case 2 but some
> users may have data important enough that having it compromised is worse
> than other consequences.

There is a huge problem with that (I mentioned it in my first message already
and Hendrik pointed it out either):
In my presented solution as well as in every other software based solution,
security is based on the "security by obscurity" principle.
Thus self-destruct will only work as long as the right software runs on the
system.
If the attacker takes the disk out of your system or uses software without
self-destruct, there is no self-destruct.

In answer to my first post, Henrik linked me to http://www.truecrypt.org/
Truecrypt allows creation of "hidden volumes", in some kind similar to my
overlapping partition idea.
IMHO truecrypt offers a very reasonable solution to the "gun pointed a head"
problem ;)

greets,
Stefan

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