This patch creates a config for shadow stack support and landing pad instr support. Shadow stack support and landing instr support can be enabled by selecting `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`. Selecting `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI` wires up path to enumerate CPU support and if cpu support exists, kernel will support cpu assisted user mode cfi. If CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI is selected, select `ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS`, `ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK` and DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME for riscv. Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@xxxxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig index 5bdda86ada37..0887a9ae0c20 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig @@ -246,6 +246,26 @@ config ARCH_HAS_BROKEN_DWARF5 # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/7ffabb61a5569444b5ac9322e22e5471cc5e4a77 depends on LD_IS_LLD && LLD_VERSION < 180000 +config RISCV_USER_CFI + def_bool y + bool "riscv userspace control flow integrity" + depends on 64BIT && $(cc-option,-mabi=lp64 -march=rv64ima_zicfiss) + depends on RISCV_ALTERNATIVE + select ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + select DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME + help + Provides CPU assisted control flow integrity to userspace tasks. + Control flow integrity is provided by implementing shadow stack for + backward edge and indirect branch tracking for forward edge in program. + Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function + return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks. + Indirect branch tracking enforces that all indirect branches must land + on a landing pad instruction else CPU will fault. This mitigates against + JOP / COP attacks. Applications must be enabled to use it, and old user- + space does not get protection "for free". + default y + config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN default 18 if 64BIT default 8 -- 2.45.0
