On 14.08.2024 7:33 PM, Melody Olvera wrote: > > > On 8/14/2024 3:30 AM, Konrad Dybcio wrote: >> On 14.08.2024 8:15 AM, Krzysztof Kozlowski wrote: >>> On 13/08/2024 22:03, Melody Olvera wrote: >>>> >>>> On 8/8/2024 4:00 AM, Krzysztof Kozlowski wrote: >>>>> On 07/08/2024 20:32, Melody Olvera wrote: >>>>>> The EUD can more accurately be divided into two types; a secure type >>>>>> which requires that certain registers be updated via scm call and a >>>>>> nonsecure type which must access registers nonsecurely. Thus, change >>>>>> the compatible strings to reflect secure and nonsecure eud usage. >>>>>> >>>>>> Signed-off-by: Melody Olvera <quic_molvera@xxxxxxxxxxx> >>>>>> --- >>>>>> Documentation/devicetree/bindings/soc/qcom/qcom,eud.yaml | 6 +++--- >>>>>> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >>>>>> >>>>>> diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/soc/qcom/qcom,eud.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/soc/qcom/qcom,eud.yaml >>>>>> index f2c5ec7e6437..476f92768610 100644 >>>>>> --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/soc/qcom/qcom,eud.yaml >>>>>> +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/soc/qcom/qcom,eud.yaml >>>>>> @@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ properties: >>>>>> compatible: >>>>>> items: >>>>>> - enum: >>>>>> - - qcom,sc7280-eud >>>>>> - - const: qcom,eud >>>>>> + - qcom,secure-eud >>>>>> + - qcom,eud >>>>> Commit msg did not explain me why DT bindings rules are avoided here and >>>>> you drop existing SoC specific compatible. >>>>> >>>>> This really does not look like having any sense at all, I cannot come up >>>>> with logic behind dropping existing users. You could deprecate it, but >>>>> then why exactly this device should have exception from generic bindings >>>>> rule? >>>> Understood. I won't drop this compatible string. Is alright to add the >>>> additional compatible as is? >>> You always need SoC specific compatible. >> Melody, is there any way to discover (that won't crash the board if we >> guess wrong) whether secure accessors are needed? >> > > Unfortunately, no. We considered several options, but none guarantee that we will avoid > a crash if we try non-securely. The secure call also won't give a specific error if it fails either > (for security reasons) so we can't know if a secure access failed because it's supposed to be > accessed non-securely or for another reason; hence this approach. If there's > another way to achieve this functionality that might be better, I'm all ears. Can we read some fuse values and decide based on that? Konrad
