On 06/02/2021 22.58, Marc Zyngier wrote:
Hector Martin <marcan@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:+static void cpu_sync_irq_to_fiq(struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const *cap) +{ + u64 daif = read_sysreg(daif); + + /* + * By this point in the boot process IRQs are likely masked and FIOs + * aren't, so we need to sync things to avoid spurious early FIQs. + */ + + if (daif & PSR_I_BIT) + daif |= PSR_F_BIT; + else + daif &= ~PSR_F_BIT; + + write_sysreg(daif, daif);Could this happen too late? If, as explained above, we can get a FIQ until we mask it here, what prevents something (a timer?) from kicking and creating havoc just before the sync?
Nothing, other than timers not being enabled this early (hopefully the bootloader doesn't leave a rogue timer running for us...)
If the answer is "nothing", then it probably means that the default behaviour should be to treat PSTATE.I and PSTATE.F as containing the same value at all times, and not just as an afterthought when we detect that we're on a CPU type or another.
I thought of this too. Originally I thought PSTATE.F was always set on other systems, and thus unmasking FIQs could cause problems if there is a pending rogue FIQ for some reason. However, while writing this patch I realized that as part of normal process state changes we already unmask FIQs anyway (see DAIF_PROCCTX).
Thus, in fact, this patch actually changes things (when the cpufeature is set) to mask FIQs in some cases where they currently aren't, and conversely to unmask them in some cases where they currently are. But the fact that FIQ masking is somewhat inconsistent to begin with suggests that we should be able to mess with it without causing breakage for other systems.
So I guess in this case it would be legitimate to just make I==F on every system, and if something breaks it should be fixed by making whatever is causing a rogue FIQ not do that, right?
That would leave the vector switcheroo as the only thing the cpufeature does, which would certainly simplify a lot of the patch.
This could expand into enabling Group-0 interrupts with GICv3 on systems that have a single security state (such as virtual machines), though I don't really see a good use case for it.
I could see having a separate vector path opening up the door for performance hacks for very specific use cases that want really low latency for *one* thing (e.g. the mess the Raspberry Pi folks do to work around that braindead USB controller's performance issues), though I imagine there would have to be very compelling reasons to develop a framework to do this sanely upstream.
Incidentally, I have a personal interest in real-time performance (especially audio); once the dust settles and we have a workable kernel for normal use I do hope to spend some time taking a deep dive into latencies and finding RT-unfriendly code, but that's pretty far off right now. Maybe PREEMPT_RT will even be merged by then :-) (I hope that without SMM to screw things up on these machines they might make very nice RT-capable boxes...)
-- Hector Martin "marcan" (marcan@xxxxxxxxx) Public Key: https://mrcn.st/pub
