On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 03:16:04PM +0800, Hsin-Yi Wang wrote: > Introducing a chosen node, rng-seed, which is an entropy that can be > passed to kernel called very early to increase initial device > randomness. Bootloader should provide this entropy and the value is > read from /chosen/rng-seed in DT. So it's really cool that you've sent out this patch set. I've been wanting this for all platforms / architectures for quite a while. Question --- are you willing to guarantee that the booloader can be trusted enough that you *know* the entropy being provided by the bootloader to be secure? If so, we could let fdt.c use a different interface, perhaps add_hwgenerator_randomness(), which allows the bootloader to transfer trusted entropy for the purposes of initializing the crng and entropy accounting for /dev/random. One of the questions is how do we make sure the boot loader is actually secure, but given that we have to trust the boot loader for various trusted boot use cases, it seems reasonable to do that. What do you think? - Ted
