On Mon, Feb 01, 2016 at 10:15:36AM +0100, Jens Wiklander wrote: > Hi, > > This patch set introduces a generic TEE subsystem. The TEE subsystem will > contain drivers for various TEE implementations. A TEE (Trusted Execution > Environment) is a trusted OS running in some secure environment, for > example, TrustZone on ARM CPUs, or a separate secure co-processor etc. > > Regarding use cases, TrustZone has traditionally been used for > offloading secure tasks to the secure world. Examples include: > - Secure key handling where the OS may or may not have direct access to key > material. > - E-commerce and payment technologies. Credentials, credit card numbers etc > could be stored in a more secure environment. > - Trusted User Interface (TUI) to ensure that no-one can snoop PIN-codes > etc. > - Secure boot to ensure that loaded binaries haven’t been tampered with. > It’s not strictly needed for secure boot, but you could enhance security > by leveraging a TEE during boot. > - Digital Rights Management (DRM), the studios provides content with > different resolution depending on the security of the device. Higher > security means higher resolution. > > A TEE could also be used in existing and new technologies. For example IMA > (Integrity Measurement Architecture) which has been in the kernel for quite > a while. Today you can enhance security by using a TPM-chip to sign the IMA > measurement list. This is something that you also could do by leveraging a > TEE. > > Another example could be in 2-factor authentication which is becoming > increasingly more important. FIDO (https://fidoalliance.org) for example > are using public key cryptography in their 2-factor authentication standard > (U2F). With FIDO, a private and public key pair will be generated for every > site you visit and the private key should never leave the local device. > This is an example where you could use secure storage in a TEE for the > private key. > > Today you will find a quite a few different out of tree implementations of > TEE drivers which tends to fragment the TEE ecosystem and development. We > think it would be a good idea to have a generic TEE driver integrated in > the kernel which would serve as a base for several different TEE solutions, > no matter if they are on-chip like TrustZone or if they are on a separate > crypto co-processor. > > To develop this TEE subsystem we have been using the open source TEE called > OP-TEE (https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os) and therefore this would be the > first TEE solution supported by this new subsystem. OP-TEE is a > GlobalPlatform compliant TEE, however this TEE subsystem is not limited to > only GlobalPlatform TEEs, instead we have tried to design it so that it > should work with other TEE solutions also. > > "tee: generic TEE subsystem" brings in the generic TEE subsystem which > helps when writing a driver for a specific TEE, for example, OP-TEE. > > "tee: add OP-TEE driver" is an OP-TEE driver which uses the subsystem to do > its work. > > This patch set has been prepared in cooperation with Javier González who > proposed "Generic TrustZone Driver in Linux Kernel" patches 28 Nov 2014, > https://lwn.net/Articles/623380/ . We've since then changed the scope to > TEE instead of TrustZone. > > We have discussed the design on tee-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (archive at > https://lists.linaro.org/pipermail/tee-dev/) with people from other > companies, including Valentin Manea <valentin.manea@xxxxxxxxxx>, > Emmanuel MICHEL <emmanuel.michel@xxxxxx>, > Jean-michel DELORME <jean-michel.delorme@xxxxxx>, > and Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@xxxxxxxxxx>. Our main concern has been to > agree on something that is generic enough to support many different > TEEs while still keeping the interface together. > > v7: > * Rebased on v4.5-rc2 > * Moved the ARM SMC Calling Convention support into a separate patch > set, which is now merged Given this breaks the build on x86-64, I can't take this :( Please fix up and do a basic bit of build testing... -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe devicetree" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
