Eddie,
I have spent half a day or so trying to reconstruct the condition which triggered this bug.
With the new patches regarding closing state I couldn't trigger this bug anymore. Which is
not to say that it has gone away.
All I can say is that I have observed this bug as described and that it is pretty scary -
the computer freezes for several minutes (until the server connection timer declares the
connection as dead) and it generates a massive load of packets.
I will try to follow this up when I have some more time; as indicated by the comment in
the patch below, I am lacking the resources to implement rate-limiting for DCCP-Sync; too
many other things to fix.
Anyone else any ideas / suggestions?
Gerrit
Quoting Eddie Kohler:
| Hi Gerrit,
|
| I'm surprised this kind of flood happens & think it may represent a bug in the
| stack. What is the acknowledgement number on the Sync packet sent in step
| (6)? It should be GSR, according to Step 6 of the pseudocode in Section 8.5.
| If it was GSR, I would expect the following denouement:
|
| 5. client responds with Reset packet Code 3 with seqno=0
| 6. server thinks that seqno=0 is out of synch (step 6), sends Sync with
| seqno=GSS, ackno=GSR, then increments GSS;
| 7. client responds with Reset packet Code 3 with seqno=GSR+1 and ackno=GSS (it
| can do this because it takes the seqno from the received packet's ackno, per
| Section 8.3.1);
| 8. the Reset is now in synch, so the server kills the connection.
|
| No flood should be possible with valid stacks; some people actually verified
| this theoretically.
|
| Of course stacks can be INvalid, in which case one should rate-limit Syncs, as
| allowed by the protocol.
|
| Your solution, which is to accept Resets with seqno 0, makes it trivially
| simple for an attacker to kill any connection. It should not be committed!
| Can we figure out why the stack has the chatter problem first?
|
| Eddie
|
|
| Gerrit Renker wrote:
| > [DCCP]: Protect against Reset/Sync floods due to buggy applications
| >
| > This patch protects against Reset/Sync floods which happens as a result
| > of either buggy or crashing client applications. The Reset/Sync flood
| > is triggered as follows:
| >
| > 1. Client establishes connection to listening server;
| > 2. before server can write data to client, client crashes;
| > 3. crashing client removes connection state at client host;
| > 4. server still thinks client is alive and sends data;
| > 5. client responds to server packet with Reset packet Code 3,
| > "No Connection", with seqno=0 - as per RFC 4340, 8.3.1;
| > 6. server thinks that seqno=0 is out of synch (step 6), sends Sync;
| > 7. goto (6).
| >
| > The result is a drastic flood of packets: In one occasion I counted
| > 345549 Reset/Sync packets, before the server finally killed itself.
| >
| > Fix:
| > ----
| > Since this condition is peculiar and can be distinguished from other
| > sequence-invalid packets, a special case has been added. The Reset
| > is accepted if
| > * it has Reset Code 3, "No Connection" AND
| > * it has sequence number 0 as described in RFC 4340, 8.3.1.
| >
| > If both conditions are satisfied, the Reset is enqueued in the receive queue
| > as usual, and will very soon terminate the crashed connection.
| >
| > Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
| > ---
| > net/dccp/input.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
| > 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
| >
| > --- a/net/dccp/input.c
| > +++ b/net/dccp/input.c
| > @@ -155,6 +155,22 @@ static int dccp_check_seqno(struct sock
| > (DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_ack_seq !=
| > DCCP_PKT_WITHOUT_ACK_SEQ))
| > dp->dccps_gar = DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_ack_seq;
| > +
| > + } else if (dh->dccph_type == DCCP_PKT_RESET &&
| > + dccp_hdr_reset(skb)->dccph_reset_code ==
| > + DCCP_RESET_CODE_NO_CONNECTION &&
| > + DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_seq == 0) {
| > + /*
| > + * This happens when connection is established and client app
| > + * crashes before server can send data. The crashing client
| > + * removes connection state, so the server gets a Code 3 Reset
| > + * packet with seqno 0 (RFC 4340, 8.3.1). Responding here with
| > + * a Sync leads to a Reset-Storm which will flood the network
| > + * until the server gives up on this connection or is killed.
| > + * We let this case pass so that the Reset gets enqueued and
| > + * will terminate the erratic connection.
| > + */
| > + DCCP_WARN("DCCP: Peer sent RESET with seqno 0\n");
| > } else {
| > DCCP_WARN("DCCP: Step 6 failed for %s packet, "
| > "(LSWL(%llu) <= P.seqno(%llu) <= S.SWH(%llu)) and "
| > @@ -168,6 +184,7 @@ static int dccp_check_seqno(struct sock
| > (unsigned long long) lawl,
| > (unsigned long long) DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_ack_seq,
| > (unsigned long long) dp->dccps_awh);
| > + /* FIXME: Rate-limit DCCP-Sync packets as per RFC 4340, 7.5.4 */
| > dccp_send_sync(sk, DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_seq, DCCP_PKT_SYNC);
| > return -1;
| > }
| > -
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|
|
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