Description of problem: First bug: Due to a logic error in the ifsbreakup function in expand.c if a heredoc and normal command is run one after the other by means of a semi-colon, when the second command drops into ifsbreakup the command will be evaluated with the ifslastp/ifsfirst struct that was set when the here doc was evaluated. This results in a buffer over-read that can leak the program's heap, stack, and arena addresses which can be used to beat ASLR. Second bug: If the heap is sprayed with a certain amount of bash variables and part of the first bug is sent, a predictable heap value can be free'd and put into the tcache. After the heap value is free'd, if the heap was sprayed correctly, an attacker can overwrite the free’d tcache address to obtain numerous write-what-where and the ability to arbitrarily overwrite any writable memory address. This could lead to a DoS or arbitrary code execution. Steps to Reproduce: First bug: cmd args: ~/exampleDir/example> dash $ M='AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA' <note: 17 A's> $ q00(){ $ <<000;echo $ ${D?$M$M$M$M$M$M} <note: 6 $M's> $ 000 $ } $ q00 <note: After the q00 is typed in, the leak should be echo'd out; this works with ash, busybox ash, and dash and with all option args.> Second bug: cmd args: ~/exampleDir/example> dash <Everything in the `` is not meant to show what exactly is typed in but more or less an action if that makes sense.> $ AAAAAAAAAAAAAA <note: These 14 A's are necessary to get initial heap groom correct> $ `spray 400 bash variables with size of 0x30 bytes` $ `send bash variable with size of 0x20 bytes` $ `send bash variable with size of 0x60 bytes` $ `spray 12 bash variables with size of 0x20 bytes` $ `Send part of first vulnerability` $ <<000000;V $ <Z*16+$Y*19>${x?0p$^?A<$B*442>$0b<B*10>dbasdfg$0<S*10>} <note: The <> in this line are not meant to be entered in as is, but instead shows amount of letter inside <> that would be entered in.> $ 000000 <note: After the 000000 is entered in the vulnerability should trigger and attempt to free a predictable heap address; while it can differ on each host, typically around variable C20 - C5 is where the predictable free'd address will be.> Patch: Adding the following to expand.c will fix both bugs in one go. (Thank you to Harald van Dijk and Michael Greenberg for doing the heavy lifting for this patch!) -- --- a/src/expand.c +++ b/src/expand.c @@ -859,6 +859,7 @@ if (discard) return -1; + ifsfree(); sh_error("Bad substitution"); } @@ -1739,6 +1740,7 @@ } else msg = umsg; } + ifsfree(); sh_error("%.*s: %s%s", end - var - 1, var, msg, tail); } --